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A journalist’s value to an employer can be seen differently in the
age of social media. The value to the employer is not necessarily just
measured by the number of words or articles produced, or even by
how much their work drives increased website traffic or increased
subscriptions. In addition to generally maintaining a social media
presence, journalists are often encouraged or expected to use
their social media accounts. However, such accounts might be in
the individual journalist’s name and might pre-date the term of
employment with that specific media entity. Therefore, a debate
can rise over who might “own” an employee-journalist’s Twitter
account, which would include access to the account’s follower
list, when the employment relationship terminates. Although this
scenario had been debated in the courts, albeit not necessarily with
journalists, throughout this decade, courts have “punted” and
avoided speaking directly on the issue. In September 2018, the trend
continued when the U.S. District Court of the Western District
of Virginia ordered a settlement to one such dispute. This Note
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proposes that absent a clear and mutual understanding over postemployment control of the relevant social media account, the former
employee should retain control over the social media account in
most circumstances—especially when the account appears to be in
the individual’s name.
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INTRODUCTION
The changes in the modern world brought upon by social media
have been significant and unavoidable.1 The interactivity of social
networks like Twitter has allowed those with large followings, like
celebrities, to interact easily with the general public.2 The flattening
effect of social media has made it such that “[e]veryone is equal . . .
[and] [n]o hierarchies need get involved.”3
As these platforms have developed, it is understandable that
social media use has become prevalent in a professional context. For
instance, Twitter can be an effective customer service tool for entities such as brands4 and public utilities.5 In addition, businesses can
use platforms such as Twitter to cultivate a unique online presence.6
1

See, e.g., Heather Rule, How Social Media Has Changed the World of Sports
Journalism, NAT’L INST. FOR SOC. MEDIA (July 6, 2017), https://nismonline.org/howsocial-media-has-changed-the-world-of-sports-journalism/ [https://perma.cc/8239-HQBS]
(“It’s been covered over and over again how much social media has changed our world the
past few years. From communication to job searching to procrastination and time-wasting,
social media leaves a mark.”); see also, e.g., Bill George, How Social Networking Has
Changed Business, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 23, 2010), https://hbr.org/2010/12/how-socialnetworking-has-chan [https://perma.cc/TP9H-6XCU] (declaring that “[s]ocial networking
is the most significant business development of 2010”).
2
See, e.g., Christine Teigen (@chrissyteigen), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/chrissy
teigen [https://perma.cc/6NKN-27YP] (showing Teigen interacting with a variety of
people).
3
See George, supra note 1.
4
See, e.g., Wendy’s (@Wendys), TWITTER (Nov. 11, 2018, 3:23PM), https://twitter
.com/Wendys/status/1061716068744523777 [https://perma.cc/MV5P-V7M8] (responding
to a customer’s complaint).
5
See, e.g., NYCT Subway (@NYCTSubway), TWITTER (Nov. 11, 2018, 2:15 PM),
https://twitter.com/NYCTSubway/status/1061699012682792960
[https://perma.cc/
D2WA-NGGM] (responding to a customer’s query). In addition to answering customers’
questions, these accounts often take the brunt of the customers’ frustrations. See id.
6
See, e.g., Lauren Katz, Merriam-Webster Has Become the Sassiest Twitter Account of
the Trump Era. Meet Its Author., VOX (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.vox.com/conversations
/2017/1/25/14378798/merriam-webster-dictionary-twitter [https://perma.cc/93LT-83A4];
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For those employed in the media industry, particularly journalists, Twitter can be exceptionally useful as a tool to promote their
work and interact with followers.7 Journalists often use Twitter
accounts with eponymous handles, rather than an account exclusively named for the employer.8 In such instances, journalists
typically use the accounts to tweet links to their work, which is typically hosted on the employer’s platform.9 Employers will often use
official accounts to retweet the reporters when they tweet a link to
their work, creating a mutually beneficial relationship where one of
the journalist’s followers might then follow the employer.10
In August 2018, Andy Bitter, who covers Virginia Tech football
for the online outlet The Athletic, was sued after continuing to use
the Twitter account that he had utilized when he previously worked
for the Roanoke Times.11 When the suit was filed, some thought that
the court might speak directly on this issue.12 The following month,
the Western District of Virginia directed the parties to schedule
settlement negotiations, leaving this novel legal issue unresolved.13

see also Tim Nudd, The Real Story Behind Steak-umm’s Delightfully Weird Twitter
Account, ADWEEK (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.adweek.com/digital/the-real-story-behindsteak-umms-weird-cultish-twitter-account/ [https://perma.cc/T9MJ-T3UM].
7
See infra Part I.
8
See, e.g., Nick Baumgardner (@nickbaumgardner), TWITTER (Nov. 11, 2018, 7:05
AM), https://twitter.com/nickbaumgardner/status/1061590710284140544 [https://perma.
cc/4VDH-L9CT] (containing a link with Baumgardner’s Detroit Free Press story about the
University of Michigan’s victory over Rutgers); see also angelique (@chengelis), TWITTER
(May 21, 2019, 9:08 AM), https://twitter.com/chengelis/status/1130822570020868097
[https://perma.cc/34F4-2WQP] (containing a link with Chengelis’s Detroit News story
about the University of Michigan’s loss to James Madison University in softball); see also
Tim Rohan (@TimRohan), TWITTER (May 16, 2019, 12:55 PM), https://twitter.
com/TimRohan/status/1129082911771287553
[https://perma.cc/8WN8-7UCU]
(containing a link with one of Rohan’s own stories that he wrote for Sports Illustrated).
9
See supra note 8.
10
See infra Section I.B.
11
See Alexis Kramer, Twitter Account Is Trade Secret, Publisher Says, Testing Law,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 10, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecomlaw/twitter-account-is-trade-secret-publisher-says-testing-law [https://perma.cc/9VMPG622].
12
See id.
13
See Order, BH Media Group, Inc. v. Bitter, No. 7:18CV388, 2018 WL 3768425 (W.D.
Va. Sept. 27, 2018), ECF No. 26 [hereinafter Order]. The parties settled in November 2018.
See Joint Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, BH Media Group, Inc. v. Bitter, No.
7:18CV388 (W.D. Va. filed Nov. 16, 2018), ECF No. 49.
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This Note proposes that, in the absence of a clear and explicit
agreement, a former employee should ultimately maintain control of
a social media account that is in their name. Part I of this Note will
first discuss Twitter and social media use, then highlight how
journalists utilize the platform, and finally assess BH Media v.
Bitter. Part II will further analyze theories in legal academic works
that were introduced in Part I, and apply those theories to the facts
of BH Media v. Bitter. Finally, Part III will advocate for an interpretive framework that invokes the right of publicity in favor of
protecting journalists.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF TWITTER IN THE CONTEXT OF EMPLOYMENT
A. Twitter and News and Journalism Employment
To this day, Twitter remains pervasive. A 2018 Pew Research
Center study found that approximately a quarter of American adults
use Twitter.14 As with most other social media platforms, the same
Pew study found that the percentage of American adults that use
Twitter has steadily increased at least since 2012.15 In concluding
their 2015 American Press Institute study, Tom Rosenstiel and his
co-authors stated that “[s]ocial networks are no longer a new door
into news. They have become a primary pathway to it . . . .”16

14

See Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2018, PEW RES. CTR.
(Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in-2018/
[https://perma.cc/R5GW-YJ8A].
15
See id. at 14–15. The study found that the percentage of American adults using
Facebook decreased from April 2016 (79%) to January 2018 (76%).
16
Tom Rosenstiel, Jeff Sonderman, Kevin Loker, Maria Ivancin & Nina Kjarval, Twitter
and the News: How People Use the Social Network to Learn About the World, AM. PRESS
INST. (Sept. 1, 2015, 10:30 AM), https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications
/reports/survey-research/how-people-use-twitter-news/
[https://perma.cc/6RUB-TJ9F].
Social media platforms, such as Facebook, have not just been a “pathway” for people to
get their news. For instance, college football reporter Brett McMurphy, while working
independently, broke a major story with an article published directly on his personal
Facebook page. See, e.g., Matt Bonesteel, ESPN Didn’t Break the Urban Meyer Story, But
Ohio State’s Fans Didn’t Seem to Care at Rally, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2018/08/07/espn-didnt-break-theurban-meyer-story-but-ohio-states-fans-didnt-seem-to-care-at-rally/?utm_term=
.2ac048098552 [https://perma.cc/F23K-M739].
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A September 2017 study found that Twitter is used as a newsgathering platform more than Facebook.17 In their 2015 study,
Rosenstiel and his co-authors corroborated this reliance on Twitter
to get news—finding that 86% of the Twitter users surveyed use the
platform to get news, with 74% of users checking for news daily.18
The 2017 study also found that, from 2016 to 2017, news usership
increased by 15% on Twitter, while remaining nearly constant on
Facebook.19 The authors opine that this jump may be related to
President Trump’s frequent Twitter use.20
The journalism industry was relatively quick to adapt to Twitter.
For instance, decorated journalist John Dickerson was using the
platform as early as November 2007,21 less than a year and a half
after the platform publicly launched.22 Even when it was in its

17

Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across Media Platforms 2017, PEW RES.
CTR. (Sept. 6, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-socialmedia-platforms-2017/ [https://perma.cc/JF88-KKSV] (finding that while a majority both
Facebook and Twitter users surveyed use those platforms to get news, a greater majority—
approximately 74%—of Twitter users use Twitter to get news).
18
Rosenstiel et al., supra note 16, at 4. Of the Twitter users who use the platform for
news “[v]irtually everyone who uses Twitter for news (92%) clicks through to read stories
at least sometimes.” Id. at 16.
19
Shearer & Gottfried, supra note 17, at 5. However, from 2013 to 2017, Facebook (by
21%) and Twitter (by 22%) had similar increases of usership to get news. Id.
20
See id. at 4 (“Since 2013, at least half of Twitter users have reported getting news on
the site, but in 2017, with a president who frequently makes announcements on the
platform, that share has increased to about three-quarters (74%), up 15 percentage points
from last year.”) (citing Maggie Haberman, Trump Tweets ‘That’s Politics!’ About Son’s
Meeting with Russian Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/07/17/us/politics/trump-russia-meeting-twitter.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/KT6GK4PT]). Since then, President Trump’s Twitter use has been legally noteworthy. See, e.g.,
Jen Kirby, Trump Can’t Block Users on Twitter, Judge Says, VOX (May 23, 2018, 3:10
PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/5/23/17385256/trump-twitter-lawsuit-block-users-loser
[https://perma.cc/2MUV-G3SF] (describing how a judge from the Southern District of
New York “ruled that Trump blocking Twitter users from his @realDonaldTrump account
because he disagrees with their views infringes on those users’ First Amendment rights
because the president’s Twitter account is a public forum”).
21
See Leah Betancourt, The Journalist’s Guide to Twitter, MASHABLE (May 14, 2009),
https://mashable.com/2009/05/14/twitter-journalism/#hJC_9Cs4GOqp
[https://perma.cc/Z7G6-CHWP].
22
See Brian Anthony Hernandez, Explore Twitter’s Evolution: 2006 to Present,
MASHABLE (May 5, 2011), https://mashable.com/2011/05/05/history-of-twitter/#Rf1KY
15bGaqp [https://perma.cc/29US-MDQL] (providing a timeline of notable events in
Twitter’s history to that point).
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infancy, journalists recognized that Twitter could allow them to
connect with consumers and sources while building a personal
“brand.”23 For journalists, Twitter can also be used to break news,24
share colleagues’ work,25 or, as demonstrated by the Washington
Post’s David Fahrenthold, as an effective crowdsourcing tool.26
Because of the sheer quantity of tweets that are disseminated on a
daily basis, “Twitter allows journalists to fully immerse themselves
in the breaking news of the subject they report on, seeing everything
from thought-out, analytical arguments to 140-character hot
takes.”27 As Greg Galant, CEO of Muck Rack, stated, Twitter “just
lends itself perfectly to news.”28
The inherent immediacy of Twitter that makes it an effective
tool for breaking news also makes it conducive to journalists covering beats.29 As such, the platform’s “mobile compatibility, easy
accessibility, concise messages, and interactive structure lends itself
23

See Betancourt, supra note 21.
See, e.g., Rebecca Lerner, Twitter Tops Snapchat—Among Journalists, At Least,
FORBES (May 26, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccalerner/2017/05
/26/twitter-tops-snapchat-among-journalists-at-least/#5580fb9e7b79
[https://perma.cc/BEY4-TEN7] (“[T]he interactive nature of the platform is conducive to
the industry’s need to share and receive constant information. On Twitter, reporters break
news in real time.”).
25
See Jennifer Peters, How To: Use Twitter to Your Advantage as a Journalist, NEWS
MEDIA ALLIANCE (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.newsmediaalliance.org/how-to-twitter-forjournalists/ [https://perma.cc/F4P9-74BG] (“By sharing the work of others, you’re letting
your readers discover new sources of information that they can trust, because they already
trust you (a huge thing in the age of fake news), and you’re helping your colleagues find a
new audience with whom to engage.”).
26
See Alecia Swasy, I Studied How Journalists Used Twitter for Two Years. Here’s
What I Learned, POYNTER: INNOVATION (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.poynter.org/news/istudied-how-journalists-used-twitter-two-years-heres-what-i-learned
[https://perma.cc/G2DF-7M56] (describing how David Fahrenthold used Twitter to
crowdsource a story about the Trump Foundation).
27
Lerner, supra note 24. On November 7, 2017, Twitter began allowing users to
compose Tweets of up to 280 characters. See, e.g., Sarah Perez, Twitter Officially Expands
Its Character Count to 280 Starting Today, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/07/twitter-officially-expands-its-character-count-to-280starting-today/ [https://perma.cc/4UT5-R39V].
28
Lerner, supra note 24. Muck Rack is a “a start-up that analyzes journalism.” Id.
29
See Rosenstiel et al., supra note 16, at 19 (“Twitter news users said ‘it’s a great way
to get news . . . in real time’”); see also id. at 41–42 (highlighting that “[s]ports and politics
beats are particularly well suited to Twitter” because “[b]oth fit well into the ‘what’s
happening now’ behaviors of Twitter”).
24
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very well to sports.”30 Therefore, Twitter allows effective sports
reporters to provide their own analysis and to use the retweet function to introduce information from other accounts to enhance the
game-following experience.31
Twitter’s impact on the world of journalism can be seen by both
journalists and sports fans. Social media journalist and author
Heather Rule notes that reporters can tweet out snippets of an upcoming story “as an appetizer” before publishing a longer story.32
Therefore, in the interim, one would likely “look to Twitter first
for things like player injury updates, weather delay information,
roster moves and stand-out quotes from athletes or coaches.”33 For
journalists covering sports beats, Twitter can also act as “a form of
note-taking,” wherein reporters can refer back to their “play-by-play
updates” and other contemporary insights when they eventually
write their article.34 These play-by-play updates also benefit fans—
if a fan misses the game, they can track the game by following a beat
reporter’s tweets.35 In addition, fans can use Twitter to interact with
beat reporters about the team, which creates a type of community in
the process.36 Rule writes that watching sports has “an added
element now: Checking social media.”37 Twitter has clearly massively changed how people watch sports.38

30

Jeremy L. Shermak, Scoring Live Tweets on the Beat, 6:1 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 118,
118 (2018) (internal citation omitted).
31
See id. Twitter allows “newspaper sports reporters the opportunity to offer
commentary and analysis, while at the same time act as ‘curators’ for game-related tweets,
selecting reliable sources and useful information for retweeting.” Id. at 119.
32
See Rule, supra note 1. To be sure, this use of Twitter is not limited to sports
journalists. See Swasy, supra note 26 (“Twitter allows the 24/7 monitoring of reporters’
beats. A reporter’s nighty ritual now includes one last check of Twitter before nodding
off.”).
33
Rule, supra note 1.
34
Id.
35
See id.
36
See id.
37
Id.
38
Id. (describing Twitter as a “platform that has really influenced the way the world
covers and watches sports”).
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Remarking that it can be addictive and destructive, today’s journalists readily acknowledge their reliance on Twitter.39 Daily Beast
contributor Erin Gloria Ryan proclaims that without Twitter, she
would probably spend a lot more time outdoors.40 At the same time,
losing Twitter could disproportionately impact the journalism industry as a whole, and could hurt individual journalists as well.41
Graham Vyse’s New Republic article notes that without Twitter,
journalists would lose a method of distributing their work and building a fan base.42 Additionally, in lieu of Twitter, journalists looking
for work could lose a valuable selling point to employers, because a
“large Twitter following is . . . an asset . . . because of the traffic it
drives to their employers’ websites.”43 Given its important role and
heavy use by journalists, their employers, and consumers, Twitter
remains worthy of legal and academic consideration.
B. Post-Employment Control of a Former Employee’s Social
Media Account
Journalists and other media professionals have utilized Twitter
and other social media platforms to share their work efficiently with
a wide audience.44 At the same time, these professionals tend to also
use social media to post about non-work activities.45 For instance,
these professionals might use social media to share details about
their personal lives, post jokes, and interact with followers.46 Taken
39

See Graham Vyse, Can Journalists Live Without Twitter?, NEW REPUBLIC (June 26,
2017),
https://newrepublic.com/article/143487/can-journalists-live-without-twitter
[https://perma.cc/7EQM-YNNY] (“‘I sometimes joke that Twitter is what I do instead of
smoking,’ Garance Franke-Ruta, Yahoo News’ senior politics editor, told [Vyse]. ‘It
occupies the same interstitial space. I think if Twitter went away we would all go into
withdrawal and have three very uncomfortable weeks—followed by being healthier, happier
people.’”).
40
See id.
41
See id. An internet without Twitter could have “major implications for journalism
more than any other industry,” and “would be professionally devastating to some
journalists.” Id.
42
See id.
43
Id.
44
See generally infra Part II.
45
See Peters, supra note 25.
46
See, e.g., id. (providing examples of journalists posting non-work-related items and
interacting with followers); see also Natalie Jomini Stroud, Interaction on Twitter
enhances journalists’ credibility, AM. PRESS INST. (Dec. 7, 2015),
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together, journalists can maximize Twitter’s effectiveness when
they use the platform to post about more than just their work.47 A
2015 study found that journalists who interact with followers on
Twitter “are seen as more credible and rated more positively than
journalists who use Twitter solely to disseminate news and information . . . .”48 Between the traffic that a journalist’s Twitter feed
drives to their employer’s website and the boost that a journalist
might gain through the association with the employer, an
employee’s use of social media is mutually beneficial to both the
journalists and the employers. Therefore, these non-work uses of
social media platforms ultimately benefit employers as well.
The question of what happens to their media personalities’ social
media accounts (and the account’s followers) after they leave their
place of employment has been widely debated since at least 2011.49
In 2013, upon leaving his post as assistant managing editor of the
New York Times, Jim Roberts maintained control of his Twitter
account that had approximately 75,000 followers at the time.50 The
New York Times not only lost Roberts’s quarter-century of experience, but also his 75,000 Twitter followers.51 When asked why he
kept the followers upon his departure, Roberts responded, “My feed
is my own.”52 At the time, a New York Times spokesperson noted
that “there is not a specific policy in place that covers this kind of
situation but, practically, when Jim leaves The Times officially he

https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/research-review/twitter-credibility/
[https://perma.cc/W3ZV-H497] (finding that journalists who interact with their followers
are viewed more favorably than those who use the site solely for professional purposes).
47
See Peters, supra note 25.
48
Stroud, supra note 46.
49
See generally Introduction and Section I.A.
50
See Ellyn Angelotti, Who Owns Your Twitter Followers?, POYNTER (Apr. 30, 2014),
https://www.poynter.org/news/who-owns-your-twitter-followers
[https://perma.cc/X2AK-M45M]. As of October 15, 2018, Jim Roberts had 204,485
followers. See Jim Roberts (@nycjim), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/nycjim
[https://perma.cc/DN9L-YCJN].
51
See Jeff Roberts, New York Times Editor to Take 75,000 Twitter Followers out the
Door with Him, GIGAOM (Jan. 24, 2013, 3:24 PM), https://gigaom.com/2013/01/24/newyork-times-editor-to-take-75000-twitter-followers-out-the-door-with-him/
[https://perma.cc/L6RL-YNHH].
52
Angelotti, supra note 50.
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will likely change his account name . . . .”53 Eventually, Roberts
changed his Twitter handle from @nytjim to “@nycjim.”54
Even before Roberts left the New York Times, ESPN dealt with
this situation as employees came and left.55 Some hires abandoned
their accounts as they joined ESPN, because their “accounts were
associated with their beats rather than their names . . . .”56 When Pat
Forde (with “nearly 100,000 followers”) and Michelle Beadle (with
“more than half a million followers”) left ESPN for Yahoo! Sports
and NBC respectively, they held onto their Twitter accounts.57

53

Roberts, supra note 51.
See Angelotti, supra note 50 (“After leaving, he revised his handle, @nycjim, which
endured his stint as executive editor at Reuters.”) (internal citation omitted).
55
See Jason Fry, ESPN Faces Challenges in Twitter Era, ESPN: POYNTER REV. PROJECT
BLOG (July 6, 2012), http://www.espn.com/blog/poynterreview/post/_/id/373/espn-faceschallenges-in-twitter-era [https://perma.cc/TA6W-U25Q].
56
Id. (“Windhorst abandoned his Plain Dealer account when he came to ESPN, as did
baseball writer Adam Rubin when he moved from the New York Daily News to
ESPNNewYork.com. (Both of those accounts were associated with their beats rather than
their names, however.)”). At the Plain Dealer, Windhorst had “built a following of more
than 70,000 people.” Id. As of October 15, 2018, Windhorst’s current account,
@WindhorstESPN, had approximately 595,000 followers. See Brian Windhorst
(@WindhorstESPN), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/WindhorstESPN [https://perma.cc
/E9AU-AA8S]
57
Fry, supra note 55. In October 2018, Pat Forde had approximately 347,000 followers.
See
Pat
Forde
(@YahooForde),
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/YahooForde
[https://perma.cc/MT8E-ZPWQ]. On November 1, 2019, Forde began working for Sports
Illustrated. See Phillip Bupp, Pat Forde is Leaving Yahoo Sports to Join Sports Illustrated,
AWFUL ANNOUNCING (Oct. 29, 2019), https://awfulannouncing.com/si/pat-forde-isleaving-yahoo-sports-to-join-sports-illustrated.html
[https://perma.cc/F6EG-CM5E].
Forde continues to use the same account, but has since changed the handle to
@ByPatForde. See Pat Forde (@ByPatForde), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ByPatForde
[https://perma.cc/T5y6-5NDD]. When Michelle Beadle returned to ESPN in March 2014,
she maintained the same Twitter account as when she had previously left ESPN. See Kevin
Yoder, The Crossover Explodes!!!, AWFUL ANNOUNCING (Sept. 26, 2013),
https://awfulannouncing.com/2013/the-crossover-explodes.html [https://perma.cc/EQM59DPU] (featuring a Tweet from Beadle under the account @MichelleDBeadle); see also
Marlow Stern, Michelle Beadle: ESPN’s Female Rebel, Raw and Uncensored, DAILY
BEAST (June 8, 2015, 5:09 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/michelle-beadle-espnsfemale-rebel-raw-and-uncensored [https://perma.cc/8L6D-TZQE] (indicating that “Beadle
returned to ESPN on March 3, 2014”); see also Jefferson Graham, ESPN’s Michelle Beadle
Takes on Twitter Trolls, USA TODAY (July 2, 2015, 3:10 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/06/26/espns-michelle-beadle-takes—twittertrolls/29186535/ [https://perma.cc/6NXN-B6TT] (featuring a Tweet from Beadle also
from the account @MichelleDBeadle). In October 2018, Beadle’s account had more than
54
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When ESPN re-hired Darren Rovell in 2012, he brought his more
than 220,000 followers back with him.58 Even in 2012, both media
employees and employers recognized the impact of social media
followers as it relates an employee’s value to the employer, asking
whether “reporters [must] surrender their accounts if they change
employers . . . .”59
C. Judicial Decisions on Post-Employment Ownership of Social
Media Accounts
While media companies like ESPN, Yahoo!, and the New York
Times were navigating the issue of their employees’ social media
accounts, several contemporary court cases were filed, which had
the potential to clarify how these scenarios would be handled going
forward.60 However, for various reasons, the courts have not yet
developed a unified method of determining whether the former
employee or the employer should maintain control of a social media
account.

1.5 million followers. See Michelle Beadle (@MichelleDBeadle), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/MichelleDBeadle [https://perma.cc/72FZ-RXMG]
58
See Fry, supra note 55. In October 2018, Rovell had more than 2 million Twitter
followers. See Darren Rovell (@darrenrovell), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/darrenrovell
[https://perma.cc/377H-JF63]. In December of 2018, Rovell again left ESPN—this time
for the sports betting website The Action Network. See Darren Rovell, Rovell: Why I
Joined The Action Network and Went All-In on Sports Betting, ACTION NETWORK (Dec. 3,
2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.actionnetwork.com/general/darren-rovell-why-i-joinedaction-network-sports-betting-business [https://perma.cc/B7BM-K5AL].
59
See Fry supra note 55. In reference to then-employee Jemele Hill, Fry wonders: Is the
“purpose of Hill’s Twitter account to promote her ESPN work and grow her audience for
the network, or help her to form closer connections with people who read and watch her?
It’s pretty clearly both.” Id. Fry continues by noting that many on Twitter “began their
accounts as personal experiments, little regarded by their employers at the time. Reporters
and analysts increasingly see their accounts as personal assets they’ve worked hard to
build . . . a portable audience for their work. In an era of diminished job security, they will
be loath to surrender so valuable an asset.” Id.
60
See e.g., John Biggs, A Dispute Over Who Owns a Twitter Account Goes to Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/technology/lawsuitmay-determine-who-owns-a-twitter-account.html [https://perma.cc/7TMA-G9UX].
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1. PhoneDog v. Kravitz61
From April 2006 to October 2010, Noah Kravitz worked as
a product reviewer and blogger at PhoneDog,62 a company that
“provide[s] the consumer with un-biased reviews and interesting
content within the wireless industry.”63 At PhoneDog, Kravitz
used an account with the handle @PhoneDog_Noah to “disseminate
information and promote PhoneDog’s services on behalf of
PhoneDog.”64 Kravitz claimed that he more frequently used that
account to tweet about various non-work-related subjects, such as
“his favorite TV shows, sports teams and music.”65 So, when
Kravitz departed PhoneDog in October 2010, he changed the handle
to @noahkravitz, and continued to Tweet to the account’s “approximately 17,000 followers.”66 On July 15, 2011, after Kravitz did not
abide by PhoneDog’s request to relinquish the account, PhoneDog
sued Kravitz in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, “asserting claims under California law for: (1) misappropriation of trade
secrets; (2) intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage; (3) negligent interference with prospective economic
advantage; and (4) conversion.”67
In the legal academic community,68 some thought this case
would “establish precedent in the online world, as it relates to ownership of social media accounts . . . .”69 Ultimately, because the case
61

PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11–03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8,
2011).
62
Id. at *1.
63
Robert J. Kolansky, Casenote, Can We Really Ascribe a Dollar Amount to
Interpersonal Communication? How Phonedog v. Kravitz May Decide Who Owns a
Twitter Account, 20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 133, 141 (2013) (citing Author Page
of Tom Klein, PHONEDOG, http://www.phonedog.com/authors/tkdog/ [https://perma.cc
/9W4U-B37C].
64
PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1.
65
Noah Kravitz’s Counterclaims and Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
and Conversion at 15, PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. 3:11–03474 MEJ, 2012 WL 554034 (N.D.
Cal. filed Feb. 14, 2012) (“Kravitz estimate[d] that more than 50% of the tweets from the
Account were personal in nature and completely unrelated to PhoneDog.”).
66
PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1 (internal citation omitted).
67
Id.
68
See, e.g., Kolansky, supra note 63, at 133.
69
See Biggs, supra note 60 (quoting Henry J. Cittone, a lawyer in New York who
litigates intellectual property disputes).
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settled,70 with Kravitz maintaining control of the account,71 no such
precedent was set. However, the case was still notable for a variety
of reasons. With PhoneDog’s alleged damages of $2.50 per follower
per month, the case became the first to grapple with a valuation of
Twitter followers.72 More significantly for subsequent cases, the
court left open the possibility that a social media account’s password
and followers might be deemed trade secrets.73
2. Eagle v. Norman74
Around the time that PhoneDog was being litigated in California, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania heard a similar case, albeit
with the litigants’ roles reversed, over a disputed LinkedIn75
account.76 In 2009, when Dr. Linda Eagle was still CEO of
Edcomm, Inc. (“Edcomm”), she was urged, but not required,
to make a LinkedIn account, and “become involved in the account
content.”77 Per LinkedIn’s user agreement, the account belonged to

70
See Stipulation for Dismissal After Settlement, PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. 3:11-cv03474-MEJ, 2013 WL 207773 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013); see also Christopher A. Moore,
Comment, Find Out Who Your Friends Are: A Framework for Determining Whether
Employees’ Social Media Followers Follow Them to a New Job, 39 CAMPBELL L. REV.
493, 504 (2017).
71
Moore supra note 70, at 504 (citing Dispute Over Ownership of Twitter Account
Settles, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP (Dec. 17, 2012), https://www.winston.com/en/privacylaw-corner/dispute-over-ownership-of-twitter-account-settles.html).
72
Kolansky, supra note 63, at 135 (2013) (internal citation omitted). Around that time,
this $2.50 “industry standard” was “derided as wildly optimistic.” See Roberts, supra note
51.
73
PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11–03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *6–8 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2011) (dismissing PhoneDog’s misappropriation of trade secrets claim on other
grounds and determining that “whether the password and Account followers are trade
secrets and whether Mr. Kravitz’s conduct constitutes misappropriation requires
consideration of evidence beyond the scope of the pleading”).
74
Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11–4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12,
2013).
75
“LinkedIn is a business-oriented social networking site accessible through the internet
for contacting current and potential business acquaintances and allowing users to invite
other LinkedIn users to ‘connect’ and communicate directly via e-mail.” Id. at *2 (internal
citation omitted).
76
See id. In this case, the former employee was the plaintiff. Id.
77
Id. at *3–4. Edcomm, Inc. “which is a banking education company that provides
services online and in person to the banking community.” See id. at *1. Edcomm “provided
guidelines” for employees interesting in creating accounts. See id. at *4.
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Eagle alone.78 After making the account, Dr. Eagle allowed
Edcomm employees to access the account, to make updates on it,
and to maintain correspondence.79 After Dr. Eagle’s employment
with Edcomm was terminated, Edcomm employees logged onto
the account and changed the password, which “effectively lock[ed]”
Eagle from the account.80 Therefore, Edcomm exclusively
controlled the account for about two and a half weeks.81 Dr. Eagle
sued Edcomm, setting forth eleven causes of action,82 while
Edcomm brought counterclaims of misappropriation and
unfair competition.83
On October 4, 2012, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
granted Edcomm summary judgment84 over Dr. Eagle’s two
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”)85 claims, and her
Lanham Act claim.86 The CFAA claims failed because the business
78

Id. at *3 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at *6 (internal citation omitted). Eagle “gave her password to the LinkedIn account
to certain Edcomm employees . . . [, seemingly] to enable those employees to respond to
certain matters in Dr. Eagle’s account, such as invitations, and also to permit updating of
the account.” Id. at *3.
80
Id. at *6–7 (internal citation omitted).
81
Id. (internal citation omitted). Edcomm’s control of the account lasted “from June 20,
2011 to July 6, 2011 . . . .” Id. The Edcomm employees subsequently altered the LinkedIn
page so that it “reflected the name, picture, education, and experience of Sandi Morgan,
the newly-appointed Interim CEO of Edcomm.” Id.
82
Id. at *14. Those claims are “(1) violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C); (2) violation of the CFAA, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(5)(C); (3) violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(1)(A); (4) unauthorized use of name in violation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 8316; (5)
invasion of privacy by misappropriation of identity; (6) misappropriation of publicity; (7)
identity theft under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8315; (8) conversion; (9) tortious interference with
contract; (10) civil conspiracy; and (11) civil aiding and abetting.” Id. Because the court
granted Edcomm summary judgment on the first three claims (two CFAA claims and the
Lanham Act claim), the court responded to Dr. Eagle’s eight remaining causes of action.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
83
Id. at *15.
84
See Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11–4303, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143614 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4,
2012).
85
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
86
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). The Lanham Act “provides for a national system
of trademark registration and protects the owner of a federally registered mark against the
use of similar marks if such use is likely to result in consumer confusion, or if
the dilution of a famous mark is likely to occur.” See Lanham Act, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/lanham_act (last visited May 22, 2019).
79
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opportunities that Dr. Eagle may have lost “were not compensable,”
and she could not recover “damages involving loss of goodwill, lost
revenue, or interference with a customer relationship . . . .”87 Dr.
Eagle’s Lanham Act claim faltered because she could not establish
that there was a likelihood of confusion due to Edcomm changing
the information in LinkedIn profile to feature the interim CEO.88
In the subsequent 2013 trial, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
ruled in Dr. Eagle’s favor on the invasion of privacy by
misappropriation of identity89 and misappropriation of publicity90
claims, but found that she failed to state a claim on her conversion
cause of action.91 Because Dr. Eagle’s name remained in the URL
after the Edcomm employees changed the account’s password and
contents, a search for Dr. Eagle which lands on a page featuring the
professional profile of Sandi Morgan “could be deemed to
be ‘appropriat[ing] to [Edcomm’s] own use or benefit the reputation,
prestige, social or commercial standing, public interest or other
values of plaintiff’s name.’”92 Similarly, a business-opportunityrelated search for Dr. Eagle that directs to a page featuring
information about her successor could constitute a tortious appropriation of Dr. Eagle’s name and likeness inuring to Edcomm’s
benefit.93 Conversely, the court did not find that Edcomm’s action
constituted conversion because a “LinkedIn account is not tangible
chattel, but rather an intangible right to access a specific page on
a computer . . . .”94
87

Kathleen McGarvey Hidy, Business Disputes Over Social Media Accounts: Legal
Rights, Judicial Rationales, and the Resultant Business Risks, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
426, 445 (2018) (citing Eagle, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143614, at *14–16).
88
Id. (citing Eagle, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143614, at *23–27). The plaintiff failed to
establish “that Edcomm’s alteration of the LinkedIn account—replacing her name and
likeness with the interim chief executive officer’s name and likeness—created a likelihood
of confusion.” Id.
89
See Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11–4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *20–22 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 12, 2013).
90
See id. at *22–24.
91
See id. at *26–29. See generally id. for the court’s additional findings.
92
Id. at *22.
93
Id. at *23–24. An internet search for Dr. Eagles directed users to “an Edcomm
webpage with Sandi Morgan’s name, picture, and credentials . . . [which] clearly provided
promotional benefit for Edcomm and constitutes the appropriation of a name for
commercial use[,] . . . ris[ing] to the level of tortious activity.” Id.
94
Id. at *28.
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Despite ruling in Dr. Eagle’s favor on several claims, the court
rewarded her neither compensatory nor punitive damages.95 The
court noted that Dr. Eagle presented no damage calculation, which
meant that “it would be pure guesswork for the Court to determine . . . damages.”96 Further, the court found that Dr. Eagle had not
“established the fact of damages with reasonable certainty,” because
she could not establish with any likelihood that, if she had full access
to her LinkedIn account during that time period, she would have
been able to make any deals.97 However, the court implicitly ruled
that, at all times, she had the legal right to control the LinkedIn
account in question.98 After this ruling, Professors Susan Park and
Patricia Sánchez Abril noted that “even when a plaintiff has a valid
cause of action in a postemployment social media dispute, it is not
clear whether the plaintiff is limited to equitable remedies alone.”99
3. Mattocks v. Black Entertainment Television100
In 2008, Stacey Mattocks made an unofficial Facebook “Fan
Page” (the “Page”) for “The Game,” a television show that first aired
on the CW Network before eventually being broadcast on Black
Entertainment Television (“BET”).101 In 2010, when BET had
syndication rights for “The Game” but had not yet begun airing new
episodes,102 BET hired Mattocks part-time to continue running the
Page, which subsequently featured BET’s logos and exclusive
content provided by the network.103 BET employees would

95
96
97
98

See id. at *42, *44.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *37–38.
Hidy, supra note 87, at 447–48 (citing Eagle, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *46–

49).
99

Susan Park & Patricia Sánchez Abril, Digital Self-Ownership: A Publicity-Rights
Framework for Determining Employee Social Media Rights, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 537, 548
(2016).
100
Mattocks v. Black Entm’t Television LLC, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
101
See id. at 1315.
102
See id. at 1314 (“After CWN cancelled the Series in 2009, Defendant Black
Entertainment Television LLC (‘‘BET’’) acquired syndication rights to televise seasons
one through three of the Series. BET began airing re-runs of the Series in 2010. In March
of that year, BET acquired an exclusive license to produce new episodes of the Series,
premiering in January 2011.”) (internal citations omitted).
103
Id. at 1315–16.
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occasionally post on the Page, and “BET regularly instructed Mattocks to post, or not to post, certain information.”104 In February
2011, about three months after BET first contacted Mattocks and
about one month after new episodes of “The Game” began airing on
BET, the parties entered into a “Letter Agreement.”105 The Letter
Agreement provided that BET would not remove Mattocks’s
“administrative rights” on the Page, and that BET would itself have
“administrative access” to the Page and “could ‘update the content
on the Page from time to time as determined by BET in its sole
discretion,’” thereby “entitl[ing] BET to ‘full access’ to the Page ‘in
every respect.’”106
When the parties subsequently began negotiating Mattocks’s
full-time employment at BET, Mattocks “demoted BET’s administrative access to the Page” which halted BET’s ability “to post content on the Page . . . .”107 In response, BET successfully convinced
“Facebook to ‘migrate’ fans of the Page to another official Series
Page created by BET” upon determination by Facebook that the
Page “appeared to officially represent the brand owner, BET.”108
BET successfully took similar action with Twitter for a promotional
account that Mattocks had also made.109
In July 2013, Mattocks sued BET, bringing five claims.110 The
court rejected the plaintiff’s tortious interference claims because
BET “ha[d] a supervisory interest in how the relationship is
conducted or a potential financial interest in how a contract is performed.”111 In addition, the court did not find that BET acted
improperly when contacting Facebook and Twitter, because those
104

Id. at 1316.
Id.
106
Id. (internal citation omitted).
107
Id. (internal citation omitted). Mattocks removed BET’s access to the Page during the
negotiations “‘[u]ntil such time as we can reach an amicable and mutually beneficial
resolution’ concerning her employment.” Id.
108
Id. at 1316, 1317 (internal citation omitted).
109
See id. at 1317 (internal citation omitted).
110
Id. (internal citation omitted). Mattocks claimed that “BET [t]ortiously interfered with
contractual relationships she had with Facebook and Twitter (Counts I and II), that BET
breached the parties’ Letter Agreement (Count III), that BET breached a duty of good faith
and fair dealing toward Mattocks (Count IV), and that BET converted a business interest
she held in the FB Page (Count V).” Id.
111
See id. at 1319.
105
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actions were “motivated, at least in part, by Mattocks revoking
BET’s full access to the [Facebook] page,” which “affected BET’s
economic interests by depriving the network of control over its
intellectual property on the Page and how the Series was officially
promoted there.”112
In further support of BET, the court held that Mattocks materially breached her agreement with the network by demoting BET’s
access to the Page, which negated any need for BET to be bound
by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.113 Finally, the court
rejected the idea that Mattocks could assert a business or “property
interest in the ‘likes’ on the [Facebook] Page.”114 The court
recognized the ease in which someone can “revoke” a “like,” and
limited the understanding of “‘liking’ a Facebook Page [to] simply
mean[] that the user is expressing his or her enjoyment or approval
of the content.”115 Therefore, the court reasoned, “if anyone can be
deemed to own the ‘likes’ on a Page, it is the individual users
responsible for them.”116
4. Other Notable Cases
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania was not alone in maintaining the possibility that a social media account’s follower list might
constitute a trade secret. Nightclub owner Regas Christou (and his
co-plaintiffs) sued former employee Bradley Roulier (co-founder
and member of Beatport, LLC) in the District of Colorado, claiming
that, upon Roulier’s departure, “Roulier or his representatives,
without permission, took the lists, web profile login and password”
of MySpace profiles made to promote Christou’s nightclubs, and
instead directed those followers toward Roulier’s new nightclub.117
In favor of the argument that the accounts constitute a trade secret,
112

Id. The court also noted that, in contacting Facebook and Twitter, “no record evidence
shows that BET took those steps for purely malicious reasons.”
113
Hidy, supra note 87, at 450 (citing Mattocks, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1320–21).
114
Mattocks, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1321.
115
Id.
116
Id. The court compared this finding to Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385–86 (4th
Cir. 2013), which held that a “public employee’s ‘like’ of political-campaign page was a
protected form of free speech and expression.”
117
Christou v. Beatport, No. 10-cv-02912-RBJ-KMT, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43459, at
*6 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2014).
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the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs took reasonable steps to
protect the secrecy of the information through the existence and
selective sharing of a password.118 Further, while the names of the
friends list is publicly viewable, the “plaintiffs contend that this list
is actually akin to a database of contact information,” because it
“is not merely the list of names but their email and contact information as well as the ability to notify them and promote directly to
them via their MySpace accounts.”119 The District of Colorado
noted that while it is eventually, albeit arduously, possible to
re-create an equivalent list of Myspace friends, it would be
extremely difficult to accomplish that task in a timeframe that would
have been useful to Christou.120 Although the court did not confirm
that the “Myspace friends list” is a trade secret, it found that
Christou’s claims were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.121
This case could indicate that “the password to a social network
account derives independent economic value because it is secret,”
and that secrecy provides a “competitive advantage” by guarding
access to the followers of that account.122
While federal district and circuit courts had been non-committal
in assigning property rights to social media accounts, the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of Texas took a different tack

118

Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1075 (D. Colo. 2012).
Id. at 1075–76.
120
Id. at 1076 (noting that the re-creation of a friends Myspace friends list “would involve
individually contacting thousands of individuals with friend requests, and it is by no means
clear that all of those individuals would grant Beatport permission to contact them.”).
121
Id. In a subsequent trial for this matter, the plaintiffs withdrew their trade secret claim,
and the court denied that it was brought in bad faith, acknowledging that the defendants
“did, without right or permission, take this information.” Christou, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43459, at *6.
122
See Zoe Argento, Whose Social Network Account? A Trade Secret Approach to
Allocating Rights, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 201, 255 (2013). That is because
“[a] competitor cannot use the account to conveniently communicate with the account’s
followers and instead must attract followers by developing her own social network account.
Id. However, at the same time, other federal district courts have not given a password the
same status. See, e.g., Emerald City Mgmt., LLC v. Kahn, No. 4:14-cv-538, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2143, at *53 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016); Ardis Health, LLC v. Nankivell, No.
11 Civ. 503 (NRB), 2011 WL 4965172, at*3 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 19, 2011); Salonclick, LLC v.
SuperEgo Mgmt., LLC, No. 16 Civ. 2555 (KMW), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6871, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017).
119
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in 2015 in In re CTLI.123 In that case, Tactical Firearms, a shooting
range and gun store owned by Jeremy Alcede and his then-wife
Sarah Alcede and located in Katy, Texas, went bankrupt.124 In a
bankruptcy hearing on December 16, 2014, “Mr. Alcede claimed
that all social media accounts at issue belonged to him personally
and not to the Debtor [Tactical Firearms].”125
Although the court acknowledged that Alcede also used the
Tactical Firearms Facebook page for personal reasons, the court
reasoned that it was a “Business Page,” and noted the page’s
content, in that it linked to the store’s website and that he allowed
employees to post store-related and promotional information to the
page.126 The social media page was deemed property of the bankruptcy estate because ‘‘Section 541 [of the Bankruptcy Code] is read
broadly and is interpreted to include all kinds of property, including
tangible or intangible property . . . .”127 Notably, the court distinguished Mattocks, the BET fan page case, by noting that a “federal
bankruptcy court, applying New York law, has treated social media
accounts as property, grouping them with subscriber lists.”128
D. Legal Academic Landscape for Social Media Disputes
These cases have spurred both legal opinions from attorneys
in the field and research from academics, which have in turn
encouraged companies and individuals to avoid similar confrontations. Commentators have also introduced a variety of potential
frameworks for courts to use to determine future disputes between
employers and departed employees over the control of social
media accounts.
In response to some of these disputes, publications often include
interviews from attorneys and experts describing what courts may
123

See In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015).
Id. at 362.
125
Id. at 363.
126
See id. at 367–68.
127
Id. at 366 (quoting In re Equinox Oil Co., Inc., 300 F.3d 614, 618 (5th Cir.2002)).
“The Code defines ‘property of the estate,’ with enumerated exceptions, as ‘all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.’” Id.
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012)).
128
Id. (citing In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 11–10614 MG, 2011 WL 5520261, at *13
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011)).
124
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look for or providing guidance to companies and employees.129 For
instance, in response to Jim Roberts leaving the New York Times,
Venkat Balasubramani, a lawyer specializing in internet-related
issues, remarked that the social media accounts in question are often
“a mix of personal and business.”130 In a potential dispute,
Balasubramani noted that an employer’s name is often part of the
account’s handle, and that the employer often deploys company
resources to promote the account an employee uses.131 Meanwhile,
the employee could note the time and effort they spent in building
an account, and how “the branding in the account name is something
that is easily changed.”132 Ultimately, Balasubramani suggests that
the issue can be circumvented with a clearly worded contract.133
Suzanne Lucas, with a background in human resources, similarly advises that employees insist on a written document detailing
who owns a Twitter account, and that social media should be “a
specialized part of the job description.”134 She also notes that
employees should not be asked to post from their previously established accounts; and advises that when multiple people post from
the same account, “it’s going to look a lot more like a business
account than a personal one.”135 Meanwhile, some law journal
articles set forth risk mitigation strategies136 and “suggest some
precautionary measures for both employers and employees to take
in order to safeguard their use of social media websites.”137
Other authors have proposed varying frameworks to consider.
These theories and frameworks will be discussed in further detail in
129

See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 51.
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Suzanne Lucas, Who Owns Your Twitter Followers, CBS NEWS (Jan. 28, 2013, 11:22
AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/who-owns-your-twitter-followers/ [https://perma.
cc/93VL-FVQN]. Lucas goes by @RealEvilHRLady on Twitter. Id.
135
Id.
136
See generally Hidy, supra note 87.
137
See Kolansky, supra note 63, at 136; see also Moore, supra note 70, at 519–20. Such
precautionary measures include adding provisions regarding social media accounts in
employment contracts, the companies themselves creating the accounts for the employees
to operate, or making employees include “sufficient information about the employer” when
using work-related accounts. Moore, supra note 70, at 519–20.
130

2019]

“WHY DO YOU WANT MY PASSWORD?”

347

Part II.138 However, first this Note will highlight a recent case139 that
raised anew the possibility that an instructive precedent in this context could finally be set, but disappointingly settled before the merits
of the case could be decided.140
E. An Overview of BH Media v. Bitter
In October 2011, Andy Bitter was hired to cover Virginia Tech
sports for the Virginian-Pilot (the “Pilot”) and the Roanoke Times
(the “Times”).141 After the papers’ joint owner, Landmark Media
Enterprises, LLC (“Landmark”), sold the Times to BH Media Group
(“BH Media”) in 2013, Bitter wrote for the Times as employee
of BH Media.142 When Bitter began in 2011, he started using a
138

These examples include Tiffany A. Miao’s advocacy for a framework stemming from
the CFAA. See generally Tiffany A. Miao, Note, Access Denied: How Social Media
Accounts Fall Outside the Scope of Intellectual Property Law and Into the Realm of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017
(2013). It also includes Professor Zoe Argento’s suggested trade secret approach. See
generally Argento, supra note 122. In addition, Professors Susan Park and Patricia Sánchez
Abril propose a “publicity-rights framework.” See generally Park & Abril, supra note 99.
Christopher A. Moore’s two-question framework will also be considered, with an analysis
similar to what the court utilized in In re CTLI, but expanded beyond the bankruptcy
setting. See generally Moore, supra note 70. Although Alexandra L. Jamel’s proposed
three-factor test is catered more toward bankruptcy concerns in relation to In re CTLI, it
will also be investigated in broader contexts. See generally Alexandra L. Jamel, Comment,
Mixing Business with Pleasure: Evaluating the Blurred Line Between the Ownership of
Business and Personal Social Media Accounts Under § 541(A)(1), 33 EMORY BANKR. DEV.
J. 561 (2017). Finally, this Note will examine Courtney J. Mitchell’s suggested framework
that “imports patent law’s shop-right rule and hired-to-invent doctrine to determine and
assign rights to a social media account and its followers.” See Courtney J. Mitchell, Note,
Keep Your Friends Close: A Framework for Addressing Rights to Social Media Contacts,
67 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1461 (2014).
139
See Complaint, BH Media Group, Inc. v. Bitter, No. 7:18CV388, 2018 WL 3768425
(W.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2018), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Complaint].
140
Kramer, supra note 11 (quoting a lawyer who suggests that “[a] well-drafted
agreement can often be the silver bullet in these types of cases”).
141
See Complaint, supra note 139, at 3 (“In October of 2011, Defendant was hired to fill
Tucker’s role as a staff writer to focus on Virginia Tech athletics.”); see also Defendant’s
Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim at 2, BH Media Group, Inc. v. Bitter,
No. 7:18CV388, (W.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2018), ECF No. 10 [hereinafter Counterclaim]
(“Bitter admits that he was hired by the Pilot in October of 2011.”).
142
See Complaint, supra note 139, at 3 (alleging that BH Media become the “sole and
exclusive owner” of the Twitter account in question following the purchase); see also
Counterclaim, supra note 141, at 15 (“In 2013, BH Media purchased the Roanoke Times
from Landmark. Bitter chose to become an employee of BH Media . . . .”). BH Media is a
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Twitter account (the “Account”) that had previously been created
and used by his predecessor Kyle Tucker while Tucker was working
for the Pilot.143 After resigning on July 6, 2018,144 Bitter continued
to use the Account145 as he joined the subscription-based online
outlet The Athletic.146
subsidiary of Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc. See Phil Walzer, Buffett Media
Subsidiary to Buy Roanoke Newspaper, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (May 30, 2013), https://pilot
online.com/business/article_ae5913a7-2707-527d-88dd-971fd132e25c.html
[https://perma.cc/SBD9-ZRXM]. Interestingly, Landmark, which had owned the Pilot for
over a century, sold the Pilot to what was then known as Tronc, the conglomerate that owns
papers such as the Chicago Tribune, Baltimore Sun, and the Orlando Sentinel. See Elisha
Sauers, Kimberly Pierceall & Robyn Sidersky, After More Than a Century, Norfolk Family
Sells the Virginian-Pilot for $34 million, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (May 29, 2018),
https://pilotonline.com/business/article_27dff746-6336-11e8-ae3a-77e23727ceab.html
[https://perma.cc/G4K9-P58G]. Tronc, which had also owned but then sold the Los
Angeles Times, has since changed its name back to Tribune Publishing. See Brett Samuels,
Tronc to Change Name Back to Tribune Publishing, HILL (Oct. 4, 2018), https://thehill.com
/homenews/media/409993-tronc-to-change-name-back-to-tribune-publishing
[https://perma.cc/9JFF-6V67].
143
See Complaint, supra note 139, at 4 (describing that the account used by Tucker then
was used by Bitter, from BH Media’s perspective); see also Counterclaim, supra note 141,
at 12–14 (describing the same events from Bitter’s perspective); see also Counterclaim,
supra note 141, at 12 (noting that Kyle Tucker took a job covering University of Kentucky
athletics for a Louisville newspaper).
144
See Complaint, supra note 139, at 6 (“On or about June 22, 2018, Defendant notified
BH Media that he intended to resign effective July 6, 2018.”); see also Counterclaim, supra
note 141, at 3 (“Bitter admits that on or about June 22, 2018, he notified the Roanoke Times
that he intended to resign effective July 6, 2018.”).
145
See Complaint, supra note 139, at 6 (“As of the date of this filing, Defendant has used
and continues to use the Account . . . “); see also Counterclaim, supra note 141, at 3
(“Bitter admits that he continues to use his Twitter account.”).
146
Backed by millions in venture capital funding, The Athletic has been notable in its
aggressive and prolific hiring, particularly from local newspapers. See Kevin Draper, At
The Athletic, a Hiring Spree Becomes a Story in Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/24/sports/the-athletic-netflix.html#click=https://t.co
/H82kxIBJa5 [https://perma.cc/6K78-V6D7]; see also Aaron Gordon, The Sports Pages’
New Clothes, SLATE (Sept. 6, 2018, 5:55 AM), https://slate.com/culture/2018/09/theathletic-is-poaching-from-local-sports-pages-and-reading-like-them-too.html
[https://perma.cc/WBE4-Z9S6] (describing The Athletic’s emergence in the online sports
media landscape). In Slate, Aaron Gordon opined that “[l]ike any startup, the Athletic feeds
off the hype and breathless coverage of the kind given to other self-appointed industryrevolutionizing companies.” Id. To that end, one of the Athletic’s early funders believes
that “they can save local sports media.” Id. In support, Gordon noted how new hires
introduce themselves to the site’s readers with “often over-the-top ‘Why I Joined the
Athletic’” that have been joked about. Id.; see also Dan Steinberg (@dcsportsblog),
TWITTER (July 17, 2018, 9:10 AM), https://twitter.com/dcsportsbog/status/101920783097
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After Bitter denied BH Media’s request to relinquish the Account,147 BH Media filed suit on August 6, 2018.148 BH Media
brought the following claims:
I.

“Misappropriation Under the Defend Trade
Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836”;149
II.
“Misappropriation Under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Va. Code § 59.1–
336”;150
III.
“Violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, et seq.”;151
IV.
“Violation of the Stored Communications
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq.”;152
V.
“Violation of the Virginia Computer Crimes
Act, Va. Code § 18.2–152.2, et seq.”;153
VI.
“Common Law Conversion”;154 and
VII. “Breach of Fiduciary Duty.”155
BH Media’s claim to the Account hinged, at least in part, on its
position that Kyle Tucker originally created the Account “within the
scope of his employment,”156 and Bitter came to use the Account as
part of Bitter taking over Tucker’s position.157 According to BH

1256832 [https://perma.cc/TGX4-NATA] (“The main reason I’d want to join the athletic
is so I could write a ‘why I’m joining the athletic’ letter.”). See Andy Bitter, Andy
Bitter: A Better Way to Cover Virginia Tech Football, ATHLETIC (July 16, 2018),
https://theathletic.com/431027/2018/07/16/andy-bitter-virginia-tech-football-beatwriter/ [https://perma.cc/GU7T-2KJ4], for Bitter’s introductory piece in The Athletic.
Between the current ownership of his former employers and his current position at
The Athletic, it can be said that Bitter’s jobs have been emblematic of the trends in
the news media landscape today.
147
See Complaint, supra note 139, at 6 (“Defendant refused to relinquish the Account”);
see also Counterclaim, supra note 141, at 3 (“Bitter admits he has refused to give access”).
148
Complaint, supra note 139, at 1.
149
Id. at 7.
150
Id. at 9.
151
Id. at 10.
152
Id. at 12.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 14.
155
Id. at 15.
156
Id. at 3.
157
See id. at 3–4.
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Media, therefore, Bitter “managed [the Account] at the Times’ direction.”158 BH Media alleges that the Account’s “primary purpose . . . is to generate interest in the Times, and by proxy, generate
advertising revenue” by linking to articles posted on the Times’s
website.159 To that end, BH Media sought a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction so that Bitter would not be able to
use the Account while working for the Athletic.160
Relying on cases such as PhoneDog and Christou, BH Media
alleged that the follower list and other information associated with
the Account would constitute trade secrets.161 When Bitter changed
the handle name and login information after gaining control of the
Account, BH Media alleged that Bitter “was authorized by BH
Media to access the Account on behalf of BH Media, and used the
Account to disseminate information on behalf of and in order to
promote the Times.”162 In addition, BH Media touted their IT policies and “confidentiality obligations” in its employee handbook to
demonstrate the company’s “extensive efforts to maintain the
secrecy of its Trade Secrets . . . .”163
Similar to the plaintiffs in Christou, BH Media claimed that it
derives independent value from the Account and its associated
158
Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 2, BH Media Group, Inc. v. Bitter, No.
7:18CV388, 2018 WL 3768425 (W.D. Va. Sept. 21, 2018), ECF No. 24 [hereinafter
Plaintiff Reply Memo].
159
Complaint, supra note 139, at 5 (noting the main Roanoke Times Twitter account
would retweet the Account).
160
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction, BH Media Group, Inc. v. Bitter, No. 7:18CV388, 2018 WL
3768425 (W.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2018), ECF No. 6 [hereinafter Plaintiff Memo].
161
Plaintiff Memo, supra note 160, at 3, 8–9 (explaining that “[t]he ancillary information
available to the Account holder squarely fits within the categories of information capable
of constituting trade secrets . . . ” and the unique information the Account holder would
gain includes features like the ability to effectively reach the Account’s followers and the
ability to direct message with followers).
162
Id. at 3.
163
Id. at 4. The handbook discussed, in part, repercussions if an employee did not “return
any Company-issued equipment . . . .” See Exhibit C to Memorandum of Law in Support
of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 3, BH Media
Group, Inc. v. Bitter, No. 7:18CV388, 2018 WL 3768425 (W.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2018), ECF
No. 6–3 (containing photocopy of Bitter’s signature on a page of BH Media’s employee
handbook).
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information “because it is not known to the public and . . . it has developed through many years of substantial time, effort, expense, research, and communication with its users.”164 Given that BH Media
asserted that they own the Account, they alleged Bitter misappropriated the Account’s affiliated trade secrets by continuing to use the
Account after resigning.165 BH Media implicated both state and federal trade secrets claims because the Account had followers located
in Virginia, other states, and internationally.166 According to BH
Media, Bitter’s post-resignation use of the Account to solicit subscribers to the Athletic amplified the misappropriation.167
In alleging that Bitter violated the CFAA, BH Media asserted
that the Account would qualify as a “protected computer” because
“[t]he definition . . . includes accounts connected to and entirely
contained within the Internet.”168 BH Media relied on a Fourth
Circuit holding that an employee’s authorization to access a
computer is based on the employer’s assent.169 BH Media’s other
computer crime claims similarly hinged on an assertion that Bitter
was not allowed to access the Account upon his resignation.170
BH Media’s common law allegations also depended on BH
Media’s assertion that it authorized Bitter to use the Account.171 BH
Media noted that the Account’s creation predated Bitter’s employment, and claimed that the Account’s login information was given
to Bitter within the scope of his employment.172 When describing

164

Plaintiff Memo, supra note 160, at 4.
Id. at 10.
166
See id. at 7 n.5.
167
See id. at 5 (“To that end, Defendant pinned a lead post highlighting his move to the
Athletic and soliciting subscriptions to the Athletic from the roughly 27,100 followers of
the Account. Thus, Defendant is actively engaged in competing with BH Media for its own
customers, and is using BH Media assets to accomplish that goal.”) (internal citation
omitted).
168
Id. at 12–13 (citing Estes Forwarding Worldwide LLC v. Cuellar, 239 F. Supp. 3d
918, 926 (E.D. Va. 2017)).
169
Id. at 12–13 (quoting WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204
(4th Cir. 2012)) (“[T]he Fourth Circuit has held that ‘an employee is authorized to access
a computer when his employer approves or sanctions his admission to that computer.’”).
170
See id. at 12–15.
171
See id. at 15–18.
172
Id. at 17 (“Account was created prior to Defendant’s first employment date and was
provided to him within the scope of his employment as a writer for the Times.”).
165
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the conversion allegation, BH Media also contended that compiling
an equivalent follower list would take BH Media several years at a
cost of $150,000 to reach the Account’s following, but could not
likely result in an equivalent configuration of the same list.173
Because Bitter was a former employee, BH Media maintained that
Bitter returning the Account’s confidential information to the
company upon his resignation was part of Bitter’s fiduciary duty to
BH Media.174 For similar reasons, BH Media alleged that the loss
it would face with Bitter’s continued use of the Account would
be irreparable.175
Bitter denied BH Media’s claims by asserting that BH Media
never preserved any ownership over the Account,176 and therefore
“BH Media’s lack of ownership is dispositive of every claim in this
case.”177 Bitter alleged that the Account was transferred from Kyle
Tucker to Bitter without any involvement from BH Media.178 To
dispel the notion that BH Media took certain action to protect the
173

Id. (“It would take an account representative or writer at BH Media seven years at a
cost of at least $150,000 to attempt recreate the Account, . . . any attempt at recreation
would likely never result in the same configuration of followers.”).
174
Id. at 18.
175
See id. at 21 (“BH Media has expended much time and effort in developing
relationships with its followers. Defendant has improperly used BH Media’s property to
threaten those relationships, the effect of which cannot be measured.”) (internal citations
omitted).
176
See Counterclaim, supra note 141, at 3 (“Bitter admits he has refused to give access
to his Twitter account to BH Media, because it does not, and never has, belonged to BH
Media.”). This filing also includes a defamation counter-claim against BH Media, largely
stemming from an article that the Roanoke Times published, reporting on the
circumstances that led to this lawsuit. See id. at 10–25.
177
Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff Andy Bitter’s Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 1, BH
Media Group, Inc. v. Bitter, No. 7:18CV388, (W.D. Va. Sept. 17, 2018), ECF No. 19
[hereinafter Opposition Memo].
178
Id. at 1–2. Bitter cites testimony from Tucker in claiming that the login information
was passed via the two individuals’ personal email accounts. See Exhibit 1 to Defendant
and Counter-Plaintiff Andy Bitter’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 3, BH Media Group, Inc. v.
Bitter, No. 7:18CV388, (W.D. Va. Sept. 17, 2018), ECF No. 19–1 [hereinafter Tucker
Testimony]. But see Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 9 n.5 (“Bitter acknowledges that
during part of his ownership of the Account, he associated his work email address with the
Account. That fact alone, however, obviously does not amount to a transfer of ownership
of the personal Account to BH Media, particularly in light of BH Media’s inducement to
associate the account with work.”).
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integrity of the Account and any of its underlying potential trade
secrets, Bitter asserted that once he gained control of the Account,
he never shared the Account’s login information.179 Bitter also argued that the growth of the account in the past seven years (from
about 4,000 to about 28,000) was through his own efforts.180
Bitter also relied on Times’s policy and industry testimony to
bolster his claim that a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction should not be granted.181 Bitter pointed to BH Media’s
2015 “Professional Standards and Content Policies,” which
demonstrate “BH Media ‘strongly encouraged’ reporters to use their
personal social media accounts in conjunction with their work at BH
Media.”182 According to Bitter’s filing, BH Media’s position could
“induce reporters to unwittingly forfeit ownership of personal
accounts . . . .”183 In addition, the BH Media Employee Handbook
distinguished “accounts provided by the Company” from other
accounts.184
To demonstrate that industry custom would favor not granting
an injunction or restraining order, Bitter obtained testimony from
J.A. Adande, a former journalist for ESPN and current professor at
Northwestern’s Medill School of Journalism.185 Adande stated:

179

See Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 2–3.
Id. at 2.
181
See Exhibit 6 to Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff Andy Bitter’s Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction at 1, BH Media Group, Inc. v. Bitter, No. 7:18CV388, (W.D. Va. Sept. 17,
2018), ECF No. 19–6 (containing testimony from Nicole Tarrant, editor of the Roanoke
Times from May 2007 to June 2013) [hereinafter Tarrant Testimony]; see also Exhibit 5
to Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff Andy Bitter’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 2–6, BH Media
Group, Inc. v. Bitter, No. 7:18CV388, (W.D. Va. Sept. 17, 2018), ECF No. 19–5
(containing testimony from J.A. Adande, a former ESPN personality and currently the
Director of Sports Journalism and Associate Professor at Medill School of Journalism at
Northwestern University) [hereinafter Adande Testimony].
182
Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 8 (emphasis in original).
183
Id. at 9.
184
Id. at 10 (citing Exhibit 9 to Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff Andy Bitter’s
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction, BH Media Group, Inc. v. Bitter, No. 7:18CV388, (W.D. Va. Sept.
17, 2018), ECF No. 19–10) (containing excerpts of BH Media’s Employee Handbook).
185
Id. at 5 (citing Adande Testimony, supra note 181, at 2).
180
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[U]nless a sports journalist has a written contract
with his or her employer that states that the employer
owns the social media account used by the journalist
or the account is one created and controlled by the
employer (e.g., @espn or @NYTSports), then the
sports journalist personally owns his or her social
media accounts and is free to continue to use those
accounts even as he or she moves to different jobs.186
Bitter also cited the example of ESPN allowing Bill Simmons to
keep his Twitter account (with millions of followers) when he left
ESPN and changed his handle.187
In arguing that the equities should be tipped in his favor, Bitter
averred that instead of “actually creating a Times Twitter account
focusing on Virginia Tech Football, BH Media has intentionally—
though unsuccessfully—attempted to manufacture damages by
instructing its writers to forego and later limit tweets about Virginia
Tech football, to imply that [the] Account somehow has an exclusive ability to do so.”188 Finally, Bitter contended that the public interest is in his favor because an employee’s account that might be
used for work purposes should not be subject to claims of corporate
ownership without sufficient prior notice.189
In response, BH Media noted that when Tucker first used the
Account, its handle was @KyleTuckerVP, “a direct reference to
Tucker’s employer,” demonstrating the intent of the Account’s use
from its origin.190 In addition, BH Media raised the existence of a
personal Twitter account, @BitterAndy, which BH Media alleged
indicates an understanding that the Account was for work purposes,
186

Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 6 (citing Adande Testimony, supra note 181, at 4).
188
Id. at 24–25. Bitter alleges that “[e]ven now, Bitter’s replacement Mike Niziolek is
not permitted to tweet from his personal account, but only through the company-owned
@SportsTRT account.” Id.
189
Id. at 25–26 (describing “an interest in protecting employees’ personal social media
accounts from claims of corporate ownership, particularly when, as here, the employer
failed to provide employees with notice their personal accounts may be subject to a later
claim of corporate ownership if used in connection with their employment.”).
190
Plaintiff Reply Memo, supra note 158, at 3–4. At this point, BH Media notes that J.A.
Adande recognizes the significance of mentioning your employer in a social media
account.
187
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and belongs to BH Media.191 To counter Bitter’s claim that the
Account’s growth was due mainly to Bitter’s own efforts, BH Media
noted the credibility afforded to Bitter through his association with
BH Media, and the access afforded to a newspaper reporter.192
In claiming that the balance of equities was in its favor, BH
Media pointed to the hiring practices and alleged motives of The
Athletic, and the related desire to “prevent unfair competition.”193
BH Media cited a New York Times article wherein one of The Athletic’s founders stated that they “will wait every local paper out and
let them continuously bleed until we are the last ones standing . . .
[and] will suck them dry of their best talent at every moment.”194
BH Media therefore proclaimed that the public interest favors an
injunction because it would help protect local newspapers in a
changing business environment.195
On September 27, 2018, Judge Michael F. Urbanski of the Western District of Virginia denied BH Media’s motion for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction.196 The court found that
because “the evidence did not clearly establish that plaintiff was
likely to prevail on the merits or the existence of irreparable
harm[,] . . . plaintiff fell short of the burden of proof required to
support the extraordinary remedy of a mandatory preliminary
injunction.”197 In further support of denying the motion, the court

191

Id. at 2 (citing Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, BH Media Group,
Inc. v. Bitter, No. 7:18CV388, 2018 WL 3768425 (W.D. Va. Sept. 21, 2018)).
192
Id. at 8 (“Mr. Bitter’s employment with the Times gave him instant credibility (as well
as press credentials that allowed him access to areas and press conferences not normally
available to the public) and a built-in audience, which allowed him to generate followers
for the Account and the Times.”).
193
Id. at 13.
194
Id. at 1, 13 (quoting Kevin Draper, Why The Athletic Wants to Pillage Newspapers,
N.Y TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/sports/the-athleticnewspapers.html [https://perma.cc/M499-KGVB]).
195
Id. at 13 (describing how “an injunction furthers the public interest because preserving
the Times’ rights in the Account protects the rights of a local newspaper and its efforts to
maintain a business in an increasingly competitive landscape.”).
196
See Order, supra note 13, at 2.
197
Id. at 1.
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noted that BH Media could not decisively demonstrate that the company had ownership over the account.198 In addition, Judge Urbanski
did not believe that BH Media “establish[ed] the existence of a trade
secret under federal or state law . . . given the public nature of the
Twitter content and followers.”199 Judge Urbanski also found that
BH Media did not “provide any evidence of irreparable harm, given
the fact that the followers of the subject Twitter account are publicly
known and plaintiff’s remarkable self-imposed ban on its own
reporters’ use of Twitter to cover Virginia Tech football.”200
At the same time, even though the court denied BH Media’s
motion, the court notably found that the balance of equities slightly
favored BH Media, given that the Account “was developed while
defendant was employed as a sports reporter for the Roanoke
Times . . . and that this activity was, at a minimum, encouraged as
part of his sports coverage responsibilities.”201 While recognizing
“arguments on both sides regarding the public’s interest in this
action,” the court found that no interest could outweigh BH Media’s
unlikelihood in sufficiently proceeding on the merits of the case, or
showing irreparable harm.202
Ultimately, the matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge to
schedule a settlement conference.203 Thus, the court took a similar
path as other courts have previously. Even as the court denied BH
Media’s motion, it did not make any declaratory statements about
these situations going forward.204 Instead, the court honed in on
certain aspects of the claims to make its ruling.205 Therefore, there
is no unified framework for a court to rely on, should a similar
situation arise again. Despite the settlement of this case, this Note
198

Id. (“[P]laintiff did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the subject Twitter
account was owned by BH Media Group, Inc. or that it was a Roanoke Times branded
account, as opposed to a personal Twitter account owned by Andy Bitter.”).
199
Id.
200
Id. at 2.
201
Id. (acknowledging a “balance of equities somewhat favor[ing] plaintiff”).
202
Id.
203
Id. After the two sides reached a settlement, the case was dismissed on November 16,
2018. See Joint Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, BH Media Group, Inc. v. Bitter, No.
7:18CV388, (W.D. Va. Nov. 16, 2018), ECF No. 49.
204
See id.
205
See id.
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will use the underlying facts to demonstrate why certain frameworks
work better than others to analyze ownership of journalists’
accounts going forward.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE LANDSCAPE REGARDING EMPLOYEREMPLOYEE DISPUTES OVER SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS
This Part sets forth various frameworks proposed by various
scholars and examines how a court might resolve the dispute
between BH Media and Bitter based on these frameworks. First, this
Part describes the frameworks that inform the In re CTLI decision.
Then, this Part explores the CFAA framework, as formerly proposed
by Tiffany A. Miao in this Journal. Next, it features a framework
emanating from patent law, as introduced by Courtney J. Mitchell.
After summarizing Professor Zoe Argento’s trade secret approach,
the Part concludes with the publicity-rights approach suggested by
Professors Susan Park and Patricia Sánchez Abril.
A. Theories Involving In re CTLI
In a 2017 Comment, Alexandra L. Jamel analyzed the In re CTLI
decision, determining that “[c]ourts should not consider social
media business accounts to be property of the [bankruptcy] estate
when the social media account: (1) has a mixed business and personal use; and (2) is not primarily used to promote the debtor’s business.”206 In analyzing In re CTLI, Jamel noted that while Alcede
might have posted information about the business on the Tactical
Firearms Page, the Page also included “his personal views on gun
control,” and “maintained that that the purpose of creating this Page
was not to generate revenue.”207 Jamel’s analysis also discussed the
differences between establishing personal and business accounts for
both Facebook and Twitter.208 She noted that Facebook differentiates between “profiles” for personal use, and Pages, which can be

206
207
208

Jamel, supra note 138, at 564.
Id. at 580 (citing In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359, 368, 371 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015)).
See id. at 569–77.
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used to promote entities such as “[a] local business, company, organization, band, artist, public figure, or cause . . . .”209 Pages, notably, are managed through personal accounts—so while each user
can only have one profile, that user can manage multiple Pages.210
Further, Jamel notes that users must access a Page through a personal account,211 and that Facebook allows users to convert their
personal profiles into a Page.212 Because of these confusions, Jamel
argues “that a line needs to be drawn to differentiate a business Page
and a Page used for ‘business’ purposes.”213
Meanwhile, Twitter, as Jamel explained, “specifically allows for
the creation of a business profile by the business,” without an
associated individual account.214 This decision by Twitter allows it
to “avoid[] Facebook’s problematic lack of a clear distinction
between individual accounts and business Pages.”215 Therefore, as
Jamel noted, while Twitter accounts created for business purposes
are “easily distinguishable” from those created for personal use, “[a]
Facebook account used for business necessarily has a mixed
personal and business use . . . .”216
With this background, Jamel proposed a three-factor balancing
framework.217 She noted that the determination should be made on
209

Id. at 571–72 (citing Create a Page, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pages
/create/?ref_type=registration_form [https://perma.cc/D3DF-VZU8]).
210
Id. at 572 (citing Why Should I Convert My Personal Account to a Facebook Page?,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/217671661585622 [https://perma.cc/KK62VU3N]).
211
Id. at 573 (citing Should I Create a Page or Allow People to Follow My Public
Updates from My Personal Account?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/20314
1666415461 [https://perma.cc/D3DX-YVR5]).
212
Id. (citing How Do I Convert My Personal Account to a Facebook Page?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/175644189234902/ [https://perma.cc/2S3U-8B6V]).
213
Id.
214
Id. at 577 (citing Create a Twitter Business Profile, TWITTER, https://business.
twitter.com/basics/create-a-profile-for-your-business
[https://perma.cc/YUM5-J5R7]
[Hereinafter Twitter Business Profile]).
215
Id. at 576.
216
Id. at 577 (citing Create a Twitter Business Profile, supra note 214).
217
Id. at 584 (“To determine whether a chapter 11 debtor’s social media accounts
constitute property of the estate, courts should balance the following three factors: (1) how
the individual account holder uses the account; (2) the ownership interests based on the
terms and conditions; and (3) whether the social media account at issue has value.”). Jamel
considers a social media account a “pseudo-property interest at best.” Id. at 597.
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a case-by-case basis, rather than relying on “their classification
as individual or business social media accounts,” particularly given
the different manners in which users enroll in the social media
platforms.218 First, she proposed a subjective analysis of how the
individual utilizes the account, which analysis “seeks to satisfy an
important distinction between an individual who created an account
for personal use and an individual who created an account for a business.”219 By analyzing the business structure of the company that is
going through the bankruptcy proceeding, Jamel hoped this factor
would determine whether “the business that arguably entered into
the ‘contract’ with the social media website [would] own the content, or would the person who actually generated (or otherwise
created) the content own it?”220
The objective second factor “defers to the social media platform
to interpret the terms and conditions the user agreed to upon creating
the account.”221 The third factor in the balancing test is whether the
social media accounts “have value.”222 For this factor, Jamel noted
that because “[a] definitive valuation calculation does not yet exist
for social media accounts . . . , it is possible that an asset of this type
would not have value to a creditor or a trustee.”223 In the bankruptcy
context, Jamel noted that when companies are making good faith
efforts to reorganize and become financially solvent pursuant to the
“fresh start” theory, turning over a social media account could
inhibit that process because the creditor could leave the account
dormant or change its content.224 Jamel concluded that “social media
accounts do not have an ascertainable value. At best, [they] are valued at an amount someone on the open market is willing to pay.”225
Jamel sums up her approach with three questions.226 The first is:
“How does the individual account holder use the account?”227 Next,
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

Id. at 586, 597.
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 593.
See id. at 593–94.
Id. at 595.
See id.
Id.
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“[w]hat are the ownership interests based on the terms and
conditions?”228 And finally, “[d]o the social media accounts have
value?”229 Using these factors, she reasoned that Alcede should
have maintained control of the Facebook account in question, rather
than the estate.230 When conducting the test for a Tactical Firearms
Twitter account, Jamel conceded that the result would likely
be different.231
Although Jamel’s proposal was developed in the context of
bankruptcy proceedings,232 the framework can be utilized with the
employee being equivalent to the debtor and the employer equivalent to the estate to analyze the facts of Bitter.233 Because the
Account does not reference the former employer and implies a
connection to an individual, it seems that Jamel’s first factor would
favor the employee.234 The Account was registered, mostly maintained, and passed from Tucker to Bitter only with personal email
addresses.235 Further, Bitter posted personal material on the
Account, with “many of [his] most ‘liked’ tweets [being] about
being a father.”236
Courts might also consider a predecessor passing a social media
account to a successor as a sign that the account was meant to stay
228

Id.
Id.
230
See id. at 595–96.
231
See id. at 596.
232
See id. at 583 (“To determine whether a chapter 11 debtor’s social media accounts
constitute property of the estate, courts should balance the following three factors . . . “).
233
Because the recent case involves a Twitter account, this analysis will mainly
concentrate on the aspect of Jamel’s framework that investigates a Twitter account. See id.
at 595–96.
234
That is particularly true given the differences in how Twitter and Facebook accounts
are set up. See id. at 573 (describing how to set up professional and personal Facebook
accounts); see also id. at 576–77 (describing how to set up a Twitter account).
235
Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 2 (citing Tucker Testimony, supra note 178).
But see id. at 9 n.5 (“Bitter acknowledges that during part of his ownership of the Account,
he associated his work email address with the Account. That fact alone, however, obviously
does not amount to a transfer of ownership of the personal Account to BH Media,
particularly in light of BH Media’s inducement to associate the account with work.”).
236
Counterclaim, supra note 141, at 14. Alcede specified that he posted non-work
material on the Tactical Arms Facebook Page. See Jamel, supra note 160, at 580 (citing In
re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359, 368, 371 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015) and also referencing Alcede
posting about gun control).
229
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with the person attached to the beat. Therefore, a court might find
that the Account was associated with the Virginia Tech football
beat, despite the inclusion in the Account handle at various times of
both Tucker and Bitter by name.237 Courts might further note that
Tucker had initially referenced the name of the newspaper in the
handle, and that the Account was created after Tucker had started
working at the newspaper.238 However, because the Account’s
handle was not directly associated with BH Media, and because the
company’s policy suggests reporters use personal accounts to share
news,239 this factor would slightly favor Bitter.
For the second factor, Twitter’s Terms of Service state, “[a]ll
right, title, and interest in and to the Services . . . are and will remain
the exclusive property of Twitter.”240 When referring to In re CTLI,
Jamel reasoned that the content is owned by Twitter, rather than
Tactical Firearms.241 Therefore, Twitter would own the content that
Bitter has posted on the Account.242
Jamel concluded that “[a]rguably, [social media accounts] do
not have value.”243 Although Twitter accounts might not have calculable value, Tactical Firearms would benefit from maintaining

237

A court could compare these facts to those of Brian Windhorst and Adam Rubin. See
Fry, supra note 55 (“Windhorst abandoned his Plain Dealer account when he came to
ESPN, as did baseball writer Adam Rubin when he moved from the New York Daily News
to ESPNNewYork.com. (Both of those accounts were associated with their beats rather
than their names, however.)”). At the Plain Dealer, Windhorst had “built a following of
more than 70,000 people.” Id. As of October 15, 2018, Windhorst’s current account,
@WindhorstESPN, has approximately 595,000 followers. See Brian Windhorst
(@WindhorstESPN), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/WindhorstESPN [https://perma.cc/
VM5A-FYU5]; see also text accompanying note 55 (“accounts were associated with their
beats rather than their names”).
238
See, e.g., Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 2.
239
See id. at 8 (referring to BH Media’s 2015 “Professional Standards and Content
Policies,” which “show that BH Media ‘strongly encouraged’ reporters to use their
personal social media accounts in conjunction with their work at BH Media.”).
240
Jamel, supra note 160, at 596 (citing Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/tos [https://perma.cc/W6RW-995P]); see also id. at 577 (“While the
Terms does not expressly state that Twitter owns the rights to the accounts, it does strongly
indicate that the rights are not rights of the individual or the business, but are the rights of
Twitter, the ‘Service.’”).
241
Id. at 596 (citing Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 240).
242
See id. at 595.
243
See id. (“(3) Do the social media accounts have value?”).
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control of the Twitter account that had been connected to the
business.244 That same logic could be applied to Bitter if the first
factor favors him. Thus, Jamel’s analysis would likely indicate that
the Account should remain with Bitter.
Christopher A. Moore also proposed an approach that invokes
In re CTLI.245 To find consistency, according to Moore, one must
answer whether a social media account can be considered personal
property, and determine which party might have the superior claim
in ultimately controlling the social media account.246 As to these
inquiries, Moore suggested that:
(1) the license to use a social media account is a piece
of personal property, and (2) when the terms of the
agreement granting the license are ambiguous as to
whom the license runs, courts should adopt a framework similar to In re CTLI when determining the
identity of the licensee.247
Because Moore deemed Twitter’s Terms of service ambiguous,
he found that courts should look to a framework similar to In re
CTLI.248 As Moore summarized, that court looked at “(1) title of the
page, (2) type of the page, and (3) the link between the page and the
company’s website” when determining if the relevant Facebook
account should be turned over to the creditor.249 Because the account
in question was a Page (rather than a profile), “the court looked at
the content and the use of the profile to determine if the employee
could overcome that presumption.”250
Moore found that the court used the following four factors to
determine the content and use of the profile:
(1) whether the employee operated a separate,
personal page, (2) whether the majority of the posts
244

Id. at 596.
Moore, supra note 70, at 512.
246
Id. Moore describes seeking “answers to two major questions: (1) whether a social
media account constitutes personal property, and (2) how to decide who has the superior
claim when two parties have interests in the account.” Id.
247
Id.
248
Id. at 515 (citing In re CTLI, 528 B.R. 359 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015)).
249
Id. at 515–16.
250
Id. at 516 (citing In re CTLI, 528 B.R. at 368).
245

2019]

“WHY DO YOU WANT MY PASSWORD?”

363

were business-related, (3) whether multiple people
within the company shared access to the profile, and
(4) whether the use of the page was for the intended
benefit of the company instead of the original
[creator].251
Moore used this framework to analyze the facts of Eagle and
Mattocks, finding that Eagle “would have been able to proceed on a
conversion claim,” and that BET still would have similarly
prevailed.252 Finally, to Moore, this approach “requires resolution of
just two questions: (1) By looking at the face of the account, who is
the presumptive licensee? (2) Does the use of the account sufficiently demonstrate that the presumption is incorrect?”253
Moore’s application of the suggested framework to ESPN NFL
reporter Adam Schefter’s Twitter account is instructive for Bitter.254
Like with Schefter, the Account is in Bitter’s name.255 Therefore,
Bitter would likely be the presumptive licensee of the Account.256
Then, the In re CTLI “court looked at the content and the use of the
profile to determine if the employee could overcome that presumption.”257 Assuming that Bitter is the presumptive licensee, a court
would likely consider if BH Media could overcome the presumption
by determining the “content and the use” of the Account.258
Because there are no tweets from Bitter’s separate account
@BitterAndy,259 this factor would likely still tip toward Bitter.
The Account is a “traditional mixed-use account” because Bitter
has posted professional and personal items.260 Assuming that the
251

Id. (citing In re CTLI, 528 B.R. at 368–72).
Id. at 517–518.
253
Id. at 519.
254
Id. at 516–17.
255
See id. at 516.
256
Id.
257
Id. (citing In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. at 368).
258
See id.
259
See Plaintiff Reply Memo, supra note 158, at 2 (citing Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff’s Reply
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction, BH Media Group, Inc. v. Bitter, No. 7:18CV388, 2018 WL
3768425 (W.D. Va. Sept. 21, 2018)); see also Andy Bitter (@BitterAndy), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/BitterAndy [https://perma.cc/5WRL-FWA9].
260
See Moore, supra note 70, at 516 (describing a “traditional mixed-use account”); see
also Counterclaim, supra note 141, at 14 (detailing use of the Account).
252
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majority of tweets Bitter sent from the Account involved his job, it
would likely weigh in favor the employer.261
Since Bitter testified that once he gained access to the Account,
he “alone . . . possessed [the Account’s] login information,”262 the
third factor would favor Bitter. Moore also found that, although
ESPN benefits when Schefter tweets links to his work hosted on
ESPN’s platforms, “there is no indication that the Tweets are sent
for the purpose of generating revenue for ESPN, but rather to aid his
work.”263 Despite BH Media’s objections regarding the Account’s
creation, Bitter could make a similar argument regarding tweets
linking to his articles.
B. CFAA
Tiffany A. Miao advocated for a framework developed from the
elements of a CFAA claim by synthesizing the Intentional Access
(§ 1030(a)(2)(C)) and the Intent to Defraud (§ 1030(a)(4)) subsections of the statute.264 Miao endorsed this approach over one that
invokes intellectual property law because the CFAA has become a
tool to “combat alleged employee misconduct,”265 and because of
“its focus on the unauthorized access of a computer—and not the
substance of the information obtained.”266 Further, as Miao noted,
“the type of violation envisioned under the CFAA is one that clearly
identifies the property owner and the intruder.”267 To that end, a
CFAA framework would extend what might be a “protected
computer” under initial readings of the CFAA to cover a social
media account.268

261

See Moore, supra note 70, at 516.
Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 2.
263
Moore, supra note 70, at 516 (emphasis in original).
264
See Miao, supra note 138, at 1055–60.
265
Id. at 1054 (citing P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party and Seasonal
Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 510 (3d Cir. 2005)).
266
Id. at 1054–55 (internal citation omitted).
267
Id. at 1055 (citing Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 475–77 (2003)).
268
See id. at 1060–61 (explaining why CFAA framework is superior to intellectual
property frameworks).
262
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Miao’s first of four main CFAA pillars is “Scope of
Authorization.”269 This factor involves whether the employee or
ex-employee was deemed “allowed” to continue accessing the
account.270 The second pillar is “intent,”271 which is demonstrated
by “evinc[ing] a clear intent to enter, without proper authorization,
computer files or data belonging to another,”272 regardless of
whether that person knew the value of the information that was
gained as a result of that access.273 In fact, the mere act of entry can
itself demonstrate intent.274
Miao’s third pillar is fraud.275 In this context, fraud “calls for a
wrongdoing of more than unauthorized access, ‘a showing of some
taking, or use, of information,’”276 rather than a showing of common
law fraud.277 Under this theory, Miao hypothesized that actions such
as logging onto an account after authorization has been revoked,
logging in and posting promotional material for a different
company, or changing the password could likely demonstrate intent
to defraud.278
Miao’s final pillar is “$5,000 loss.”279 She recognized that the
losses that parties sustained in the cases referenced above (such as
replacing advertising and lost value of subscribers) are unlikely to
be compensated under the CFAA.280 However, as Miao indicated,
companies could claim employee time, third party expenses in
contacting the social media platforms to recover accounts, or

269

Id. at 1056–57.
See id. For this factor, that there are relevant jurisdictional differences in how scope
of authorization is determined. In the next Part, those differences will be investigated.
271
See id. at 1057–58.
272
Id. (quoting United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 459 (C.D. Cal. 2009)).
273
Id. at 1058 (citing U.S. v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2007)).
274
Id. (citing Willis, 476 F.3d at 1125 n.1) (describing how entry “may in and of itself
corroborate intent”).
275
See id. at 1058–59.
276
Id. at 1058 (quoting P.C. Yonkers, 428 F.3d at 509).
277
Id. (citing Shawn E. Tuma, “What Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care?”—A
Primer On the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for Civil Litigators, 63 S.C. L. REV. 141,
163 (2011)).
278
Id. at 1059 (internal citations omitted).
279
See id. at 1059–60.
280
Id. (internal citations omitted).
270
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expenses incurred in determining the value of the account as losses
pursuant to a CFAA claim.281
It is difficult to apply Miao’s framework to the Bitter case
because the sides disagree regarding the inspiration for generating
the Account. If Bitter maintains that the Account was not created at
the direction of the Pilot or Times, this analysis would be moot.
However, according to Miao, determining scope of authorization
would depend on the jurisdiction.282
Under the Seventh Circuit’s Citrin standard, an employer can
argue that accessing a social media account “without authorization”
would be outside the requisite scope when an employee “accesses
the employer’s computer and uses the information obtained in a
manner adverse to the employer’s economic interest.”283 Although
Bitter did not testify to changing the password after he left BH
Media, his refusal to provide that information upon BH Media’s
request has the same effect. Both Bitter’s use of the Account to
solicit subscribers to The Athletic, as well as providing links to his
work hosted on The Athletic’s website, arguably hurt BH Media’s
economic interest.284
The Ninth Circuit’s Brekka-Nosal standard, on the other hand,
involves “a narrower interpretation of authorization[,] . . . stat[ing]
that one ‘exceeds authorized access’ when an employee is authorized to access only certain information but then accesses unauthor-

281

Id. (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 1056–57 (summarizing the difference between the Citrin standard in the
Seventh Circuit and the Brekka-Nosal standard, used in the Ninth Circuit).
283
Id. at 1036 (citing Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir.
2006)). Under Citrin, an employee is “‘unauthorized’ . . . when she accesses the computer
in a way that contradicts the employer’s interest.” Id. at 1037.
284
See Plaintiff Memo, supra note 160, at 5 (“To that end, Defendant pinned a lead post
highlighting his move to the Athletic and soliciting subscriptions to the Athletic from the
roughly 27,100 followers of the Account. Thus, Defendant is actively engaged in
competing with BH Media for its own customers, and is using BH Media assets to
accomplish that goal.”) (internal citation omitted).
282
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ized information; the issue of how the information is used is irrelevant.”285 A Brekka-Nosal court could view Bitter’s refusal to relinquish the Account’s login information in the same manner.
However, Bitter could argue that his use of the Account after
leaving BH Media does not exceed any authorization, because BH
Media did not have authorization in the first place.286 Because “the
only proof necessary is ‘that the defendant intentionally accessed
information from a protected computer,’” Bitter’s decision to use
the Account after warnings from BH Media would qualify as
intentional access.287 On the other hand, Bitter’s belief that the
Account never belonged to BH Media would indicate that there was
no intentional access of BH Media’s computer. However, Bitter’s
use of the Account to solicit subscribers to The Athletic would likely
constitute an intent to defraud because the account was used to promote a competing organization.288
Finally, as noted above, the last pillar in Miao’s analysis is the
$5,000 loss. Depending on the judge and court, BH Media might be
able to claim such losses as employee time or third party expenses
incurred in reaching out to the social media website.289 Altogether,
it is unlikely that BH Media would prevail under Miao’s CFAAbased framework, even if the first elements were not left open by a
disputed question of fact. Given the uniquely mixed purpose and
nature of social media presences like the Account, a CFAA framework would probably not be helpful in disputes involving former
employees in circumstances similar to that of Andy Bitter.

285

Miao, supra note 138, at 1057 (citing United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), 676 F.3d 854,
863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). Miao opines that changing an account’s password would
be considered “access to unauthorized information.” Id.
286
See Counterclaim, supra note 141, at 3 (“Bitter admits he has refused to give access
to his Twitter account to BH Media, because it does not, and never has, belonged to BH
Media.”).
287
See Miao, supra note 138, at 1058 (quoting United States v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121,
1125 (10th Cir. 2007)). In fact, “the act of entering in the access information may in and
of itself corroborate intent.” Id.
288
See id. at 1059 (citing EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583
(1st Cir. 2001)).
289
See supra Part I.C.
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C. Hired-to-Invent and Shop Right Theories
Courtney J. Mitchell’s suggested framework implicates the
hired-to-invent and shop right doctrines.290 This approach would
“bypass the difficult and slippery trade secrets analysis,” which can
be especially messy for accounts with large followings.291 To
jumpstart this process, when assessing the employment relationship
and the relevant social media account, a court would first “determine
whether to apply the hired-to-invent doctrine or the shop-right
rule . . . .”292 If a court deems that the employee was “hired to
invent,” then “the employee’s rights to access the account to communicate with its contacts would terminate with [their] employment.”293 A court would invoke the hired-to-invent doctrine if someone were expressly hired to maintain an employer’s social media
presence.294 Mitchell compares this to the original patent context,
wherein there is a contractual quid pro quo: “maintenance of a
creative social media presence in exchange for compensation.”295
Further, Mitchell opines that this arrangement would maintain the
incentive structure for both employer and employee.296
Under Mitchell’s assessment, Noah Kravitz’s situation would
have satisfied the hire-to-invent doctrine, despite Kravitz injecting

290

See Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1488 (“Therefore, following the shop-right and hiredto-invent doctrines can resolve the question of rights to social media followers . . . . In
importing the hired-to-invent and shop-right doctrines to resolve the issue of social media
accounts, the different policy issues at stake should be considered.”).
291
Id. at 1489–90 (“The court would not have to grapple with whether a public list could
be considered ‘secret’ by virtue of containing seventeen thousand names. Nor would it
have to determine whether the value of the contacts derived independent value based on
that secrecy, let alone what that value was.”).
292
Id. at 1488. Included in this determination would be the parties’ expectations when
entering the employment relationship. Id. at 1490.
293
Id. at 1488. While recognizing the tediousness and difficulty of the task, Mitchell adds
that “[s]ince an account’s contacts are publicly available, this would not prevent the former
employee from reaching out to the account’s contacts on her own.” Id.
294
Id. at 1489.
295
Id.
296
See id. (“It would also preserve the incentive structure: employees’ compensation
would serve as incentive to continue to maintain the social media account, and give
employers assurance that employees would not use social media accounts, and the access
to followers that they provide, to compete with employers when they leave. In turn, this
would encourage employers to invest in effective, creative social media.”).
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his own personality into his work-related posts, and sometimes sharing non-PhoneDog-related content.297 Pursuant to Kravitz’s duties
as product reviewer and video blogger, “the account’s purpose was
ultimately to attract new customers and produce advertising revenue
for PhoneDog.”298 To Mitchell, therefore, the “contractual quid pro
quo” to make Kravitz hired-to-invent meant that “PhoneDog provided Kravitz compensation in exchange for his efforts at attracting
new followers and maintaining the Twitter account.”299
If the employer would analogously be allowed a shop right, then
the employer would be able to access the account to help the
business during and after the employee’s tenure.300 But, as Mitchell
proclaimed, “the employee should have ultimate control of the
account and retain access to it and its contacts after her employment
ends, while the former employer’s ability to access the account to
communicate with its contacts should terminate.”301 Because of the
nature of social media accounts, Mitchell theorized that where a
shop-right exists and an employee has left the employer, the
employer should be allowed to reach out to the account’s followers
to let those followers know of ways to maintain contact with the
employer organization or successor employee.302
A court would find a shop right when “employees use social
media in connection with their employment, even though their
duties do not expressly, or even impliedly, include maintaining
social media accounts.”303 Included in shop-right would be “scenarios in which employees have pre-existing personal social media
accounts to which they actively and regularly post work-related

297

Id.
Id. (citing PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11–03474 MEJ, 2012 WL 273323, at *1–2
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2012)).
299
Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1489.
300
Id. at 1488. A shop right exists when an employee invents something, and the
employer is granted a “nonexclusive, nontransferable royalty-free license to use the
invention in the business.” Id. at 1485 (internal citations omitted). When there is a shop
right, “the employer can use the invention in the course of running the business, even after
termination of employment, without the risk of an infringement suit and without paying a
royalty.” Id.
301
Id. at 1488.
302
Id.
303
Id. at 1490.
298
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information, such as a real estate broker who systematically posts
status updates about upcoming open houses, or a retail clerk who
frequently tweets about new inventory or upcoming sales.”304 The
same is true when there are high-ranking executives or other
employees who have strong connections with their employers and
use social media tangentially to their employment.305 In these scenarios, it is also possible for the employee’s social media use to
bring in business for their employers, which means that the
employer would have to expend resources related to the employee’s
social media account.306
A shop right in this social media context would also consider the
nature of the employee’s job as it relates to whether the employee
is using the social media account “on the clock.”307 The final factor,
whether the employee would allow the employer to use the
invention, could also be utilized in the social media setting.308
Courts would consider, for instance, whether the account has the
employer’s marks or links to the employer’s website.309 When an
employee uses their previously established account for work
purposes and gives the employer their password, “this should weigh
even more strongly in favor of granting a shop right, since it directly
manifests the employee’s willingness for the employer to use and
control the account.”310 Therefore, under such an analysis, Edcomm
would be granted a shop right in Linda Eagle’s LinkedIn account.311
Bitter and BH Media would likely diverge when deciding
whether the Account deserves hired-to-invent or shop-right
304

Id.
Id. at 1491 (describing when “employees who are strongly identified with their
companies, such as high-ranking executives, use social media only incidentally to their
employment, for example, a company executive who maintains a personal Facebook
account or has a LinkedIn account listing his or her complete work and educational
history”).
306
Id. at 1490–91.
307
Id. at 1492 (“Some employees are so closely associated with their occupations that it
is hard or impossible to dissociate them from their professional identities or to say that they
ever are ‘off the clock.’ This would likely be the case with a company executive high
enough in rank to owe fiduciary duties.”).
308
Id.
309
Id.
310
Id.
311
See id. at 1494.
305
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analysis.312 BH Media would claim that Bitter was hired pursuant
to the hired-to-invent doctrine. So, Bitter’s ability to access the
Account would end with his resignation.313 BH Media could bolster
its hired-to-invent claim with the argument that Tucker started
the Account in the course of his employment and “managed it at the
Times’s direction.”314 Therefore, to BH Media, the Account’s
“primary purpose . . . is to generate interest in the Times, and by
proxy, generate advertising revenue . . . [by] tweet[ing] links to
articles published on the Times’s website directing users to the
Times.”315 BH Media could compare this situation favorably
to PhoneDog, because the @PhoneDog_Noah “account’s purpose
was ultimately to attract new customers and produce advertising
revenue for PhoneDog.”316 BH Media would consider Bitter’s efforts in growing the Account’s followers as part of his job and pursuant to the “contractual quid pro quo” that is crucial to the hiredto-invent doctrine.317
Bitter, on the other hand, would likely argue first that BH Media
does not even have a shop right in the Account. Such an argument
would likely rely on Bitter’s insistence that the Account was started
as Tucker’s personal account, and then the transfer was a personal
decision between Tucker and Bitter as individuals.318 Alternately,
Bitter could argue that his use of the Account while employed
by BH Media is akin to a shop right. Thus, Bitter’s use of the
Account would be analogous to “scenarios in which employees have
pre-existing personal social media accounts to which they actively
and regularly post work-related information . . . .”319

312

See id. at 1488.
See id. (“[T]he employee’s rights to access the account to communicate with its
contacts would terminate with her employment.”).
314
Plaintiff Reply Memo, supra note 158, at 2–3.
315
Complaint, supra note 139, at 5.
316
Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1489 (citing PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11–03474, 2012
WL 273323, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2012)). Mitchell considers PhoneDog a hired-toinvent scenario. See id.
317
See id. (describing the “contractual quid pro quo”); see also text accompanying note
299.
318
See Opposition Memo supra note 177, at 2.
319
Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1490.
313
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As support, Bitter could point to his former employer’s silence
regarding the Account when he was hired.320 In addition, Bitter
could argue that reporters were “strongly encouraged” to use
personal social media accounts “in conjunction with their work at
BH Media.”321 Since the use of personal social media accounts was
not required by BH Media, Bitter could argue that a shop right was
created, since the “employees[‘] duties . . . do not expressly, or even
impliedly, include maintaining social media accounts.”322 Ultimately, a finding that BH Media has a shop right in the Account is
the most sensible. As mentioned above, there is a shop right when
an employee’s account benefits the employer, and when use of the
employer’s resources also helps boost the popularity of an employee’s account.323 The court could note that the Account’s original
handle contained the newspaper’s name,324 and that Bitter frequently linked to his articles published by the Times while using the
Account in connection with his job following Virginia Tech football
at BH Media.
Finding a shop right would fit with both parties’ general
expectation that a journalist will use a social media account,325 and
would be aligned with what is more likely viewed as industry
standard.326 This solution could help employers as they replace the
social media impact of a former employee, because finding a shop

320

See Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 2–3 (“Bitter has never signed or been asked
to sign any document transferring ownership of his count or giving BH Media any
information about his Account . . . . Neither his employment offer letter from the Pilot, nor
any subsequent agreement with any entity, assigned ownership of his Account to the Pilot
or granted the Pilot, or any other entity, any rights whatsoever in his Account.”) (internal
citations omitted).
321
See id. at 8.
322
Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1490.
323
See id. at 1490–91; see also text accompanying note 303.
324
See Plaintiff Reply Memo, supra note 158, at 3–4; see also text accompanying note
214 (noting that the handle was @KyleTuckerVP).
325
See Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1490. Included in this determination would be the
parties’ expectations when entering the employment relationship.
326
See Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 5 (citing Adande Testimony, supra note
181); see also Adande Testimony, supra note 181, at 2.
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right could allow the employer to contact the account’s followers to,
perhaps, follow the account of the former employee’s successor.327
D. Trade Secret
Professor Zoe Argento’s article proposed that courts should
deem a social media account’s password to be a trade secret.328
Argento advocated for a trade secret framework because a password’s inherent intended secrecy “qualifies for narrow trade secret
protection and provides a legal basis for asserting a right of exclusive access to the account itself.”329 As such, the password “must
satisfy three requirements to qualify for trade secret protection.”330
First, the password “must not be generally known or readily
ascertainable to those who might obtain economic value from its
use.”331 As Argento noted, treating a password like a trade secret
renders it somewhat unconventional because “login information for
a given account can be changed repeatedly.”332 Therefore the “secret
of access” would lie with the “information necessary to access the
account at any time,” not with “one specific set of alphanumeric
strings or other combination of information.”333 A consistent effort
to keep an account’s log-in information secret should suffice.334
Second, “the information must derive independent economic
value from being secret.”335 Argento noted that one could
economically benefit from the ability to gain access to a popular
account.336 At the same time, however, Argento acknowledged that
a password lacks inherent value.337 Because follower lists are often

327

See Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1488 (“[T]he employer would have access to the
contacts for purposes of furthering the business both during and after the employee’s term
of employment.”).
328
See Argento, supra note 122, at 249.
329
Id.
330
Id.
331
Id. (citing UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985)).
332
Id.
333
Id.
334
Id. at 250.
335
Id. at 249 (citing UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985)).
336
Id. at 252 (“Many parties would gain economic benefit from accessing a widely
followed account.”).
337
Id. at 253 (describing that a “password has no intrinsic value”).
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public, this narrow trade secret protection “would only grant the
rights holder exclusive use of links from the account,” which include
exclusively and efficiently communicating to the account’s followers.338 Given the time and effort it would take to re-establish an
account’s potential large number of followers, Argento opined that
this could signify an economic value.339 Ultimately, “the password
to a social network account derives independent economic value
because it is secret.”340
Finally, the third factor specifies that “the information must be
subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.”341 When
the owner of a trade secret precludes someone from sharing information by way of a confidentiality agreement, it has been found that
a reasonable effort has been made to sufficiently keep the
information secret.342 This third factor is often implicit when considering the first factor.
Professor Argento began the trade secret analysis by stating that
“the party that does the work of creating the account should, by
default, have the rights to the account.”343 In this context, Bitter
could reiterate his contention that the Account passed from Tucker
to Bitter “in an unbroken chain of ownership that does not include
BH Media.”344 Given Bitter’s framing of the responsibility for
growing the account,345 he could point to Argento’s distinction that
creating an account “should not be defined as merely the trivial work
of opening the account, . . . but as the substantial investment of time
and energy needed to develop the links in the account.”346

338

Id. at 223 (“Links are only virtual representations of real links between real people.
The party which loses the account can always start a new account and set up new links to
the same people.”). A user is linked to another’s account when, on Twitter for example,
one selects to follow another. Id.
339
See id. at 255–56 (describing the benefit in the context of PhoneDog).
340
Id. at 255.
341
Id. at 249 (citing UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985)).
342
Id. at 251 (citing Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714
(7th Cir. 2003)).
343
Id. at 263 (internal citations omitted).
344
See Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 1–2 (describing the “unbroken chain”).
345
See id. at 2 (describing that the account of the growth was “[t]hrough [Bitter’s] own
efforts”).
346
Argento, supra note 122, at 263.
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In response, BH Media would likely argue that “where the
parties have agreed, even impliedly, that the worker created
the account in exchange for his salary or other compensation, the
employer should have the rights to the account.”347 To that point,
BH Media could repeat their claims that Tucker, and then Bitter,
used the Account under an implied agreement.348 Bitter could
counterargue that he was never asked to sign anything related to the
Account, and that BH Media policies ask reporters to use personal
accounts when breaking news.349 In addition, Bitter could echo
Argento’s recognition that using a social media account “on the
employer’s behalf does not end the analysis.”350 Therefore, “the fact
that a worker agreed to use [his or] her social network account to
benefit the employer . . . does not necessarily imply that the parties
agreed that the account itself belongs to the employer.”351 Argento
specifically noted that a social media account used by an employee
can be for mutually beneficial purposes—when an employee shares
their work hosted on an employer’s platform, it creates publicity for
the employee while pointing to employer’s interest as publisher and
host of the employee’s content.352
Although the analysis favors Bitter, it is not a straightforward
case where the employee is ordered to make social media accounts
for the employer to use.353 It is prudent to also look to “custom,
relation to the employer’s business, and the employer’s dedication
of resources to the task [] to determine whether the employer made
clear its expectation that the worker create a social network account
for the employer in exchange for compensation.”354 As part of this
analysis, Argento argued that the account’s content can speak to the
347

Id.
See Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 1–2.
349
See id. at 2–3, 8 (citing BH Media’s 2015 “Professional Standards and Content
Policies,” which “show that BH Media ‘strongly encouraged’ reporters to use their
personal social media accounts in conjunction with their work at BH Media.”) (internal
citation omitted).
350
Argento, supra note 122, at 266.
351
Id.
352
Id. at 267.
353
Id. at 266–67.
354
Id. at 267. “An employer’s dedication of resources to help workers develop social
network accounts, such as guidance, training, and evaluation, would also indicate
agreement.” Id.
348
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purpose for which the account was formulated and utilized.355 As
for the burden of proof in determining the parties’ intent, Professor
Argento noted that “the employer should bear a heavy burden” in
demonstrating that the parties had agreed that the employer would
control a social media account.356
When considering industry custom in the BH Media case, Bitter
could rely on J.A. Adande’s testimony,357 and the experience of
many journalists employed by ESPN.358 Conversely, BH Media
could analogize to instances of journalists abandoning their previous
accounts because they were “associated with their beats rather than
their names.”359 However, the Account has always contained the
user’s name in some capacity.360 Despite this, given that Bitter
predominantly tweeted about Virginia Tech football with the
Account, it is likely that the “relation to the employer’s business”
factor would likely tip toward BH Media.
For the next consideration, a court would probably find that the
“employer’s dedication of resources” tips toward BH Media. BH
Media might note that the Account’s popularity was boosted
because the employer’s main Twitter account would retweet the
Account.361 Bitter could counter that it was BH Media’s stated
policy for journalists to use their personal accounts,362 which could
demonstrate an understanding that retweets from corporate accounts
could benefit a reporter individually. BH Media could also note that

355

Id.
Id. at 266.
357
See generally Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 5–7 (describing (1) J.A. Adande’s
opinion that Bitter should own his personal social media account absent a contract stating
otherwise, and (2) given Adande’s reputation, how his opinion is reflective of the industry
standards); see also supra text accompanying notes 59–65.
358
See supra Part II.B; see also Adande Testimony, supra note 181, at 4–6 (describing
additional examples).
359
Fry, supra note 55; see also text accompanying note 55. Examples include Adam
Rubin and Brian Windhorst.
360
See, e.g., Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 1.
361
See Complaint, supra note 139, at 5 (“Likewise, the Roanoke Times’s main Twitter
account then retweets the Account’s tweets (or vice versa). This utilization of Twitter
drives traffic to the Times’s website and generates advertising revenue for the Times based
on the number of clicks it receives on its various original stories and content.”).
362
See Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 8.
356
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Bitter was aided by employer-issued equipment and access to “areas
and press conferences not normally available to the public . . . .”363
Argento also suggested courts examine “the name of the
account, exclusivity of access, the type of account, and whether the
account preexists the employment relationship.”364 BH Media could
point to fact that the Account’s original handle included the
newspaper’s name.365 In addition, they could point to their accounting of the circumstances surrounding the Account’s transfer to Bitter, highlighting that the account predated Bitter’s employment at
BH Media.366
In response, Bitter could note that even after he began working
for only one newspaper, the account’s handle did not change.367 In
addition, Bitter could cite to Adande’s testimony, which explained
that employers should only own accounts “created and controlled by
the employer (e.g., @espn or @NYTSports) . . . .”368 Given industry
custom and that Bitter did not change the Account’s handle after
beginning to work for a single newspaper, this factor would likely
weigh toward Bitter.
The “exclusivity of access” factor would likely tip toward Bitter
because after the transfer, he never shared the login information and
was the only person to use the Account.369 Similarly, the type of
account at issue would also likely weigh in Bitter’s favor;370 the
Account’s name did not feature any employer, and instead contained
information that followers would associate with Bitter.
As for the final consideration, whether the account preexists the
relationship, it is undisputed that the Account pre-existed Bitter’s
363

Plaintiff Reply Memo, supra note 158, at 8.
Argento, supra note 122, at 268.
365
Plaintiff Reply Memo, supra note 158, at 3–4.
366
See id. at 6.
367
See id. at 7 (describing the Account’s handle as Bitter began to utilize it); see also,
e.g., Opposition Memo supra note 177, at 16 n.12, (providing links, as the 9/17/18 filing,
showing the Account’s name remaining).
368
Adande Testimony, supra note 181, at 2–3. Adande also talks about leaving his
affiliation off of his handle because he views the Twitter account as a piece of his personal
brand. Id. at 3.
369
See Opposition Memo supra note 177, at 2–3.
370
As discussed previously, businesses can make their own Twitter accounts separate
from individuals. See text accompanying notes 184–86.
364
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employment with BH Media and the company’s predecessor.371
Bitter would respond by noting that Tucker created the Account
because he viewed Twitter “as a new and interesting way to connect
with people,” and that “[t]he Pilot did not ask Tucker” to create the
Account.372 Bitter could further contend that when he controlled the
Account, he was not asked to transfer the Account, nor was he told
that the Account belonged to his employer.373
As demonstrated, aspects of this analysis favor both sides.
Ultimately, though, the trade secret framework would likely favor
Bitter. Given the confusion in the record, and the “heavy burden”
BH Media needs to overcome, it does not seem likely that a court
would find that BH Media sufficiently “made clear its expectation”
to Bitter that they would control the Account upon his departure.374
E. Publicity-Right Framework
Professors Park and Abril suggested a framework for social
media disputes that stems from publicity rights.375 Working from the
four elements for a right of publicity claim outlined in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, Park and Abril developed a
five-part analysis which could be used by courts to determine
ultimate ownership of a social media account that was used for
professional and non-professional purposes.376 The “five overarching themes” underlying this analysis are: (1) the purpose and nature
of the employment relationship; (2) the purpose and nature of the
social media account, including its creation; (3) the employer’s
access or control of the social media account; (4) the degree to which
the employee’s persona is infused in the forum; and (5) the injury
caused by the employer’s alleged infringement.377
371

See Plaintiff Reply Memo, supra note 158, at 7.
Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 3 (internal citations omitted).
373
See id. at 2–3.
374
See Argento, supra note 122, at 267.
375
See Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 581–98.
376
Id. at 588. Per the Restatement, “[a] claimant must show that (1) the defendant used
the plaintiff ‘s identity (2) for the defendant’s commercial (or other) advantage (3) without
the plaintiff’s consent, (4) causing injury.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
377
Id. at 588. See id. at 596–98 (Appendix A) for a larger list of questions that will also
be considered with greater depth in Part III.
372
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The first theme, “purpose and nature of employment relationship,” is fairly self-explanatory. For instance, if someone was
hired to manage a company’s social media accounts, this factor
supports the employer maintaining possession.378 Conversely, when
an employee uses an account created for personal purposes to
sporadically promote an employer’s business, and social media was
not explicitly part of the employee’s job description, that would
weigh in favor of the employee retaining the account.379
For the second theme, “purpose and nature of the social media
account,”380 Park and Abril suggest that courts would examine
whether the employer or employee created the account, whether the
employee’s previously established social media following was
a consideration in hiring, and whether that audience migrated when
the employee was hired.381 The reasons and timing for an account’s
creation, particularly in relation to hiring, would also be
considered.382 Additionally, Park and Abril emphasized the
registration information connected to the account,383 i.e., if the
account is set up in the employee’s name.384
Park and Abril’s third factor is “employer access and control.”385
Under this prong, a judge would consider the extent to which the
employer controls the account.386 Here, courts would determine
if the employee was told or directed to post or not post certain
content to the account in question.387 Under this factor, courts would
also consider who had control and knowledge of the account’s
login information.388

378

Id. Park and Abril believe this factor would weigh toward PhoneDog and against
Kravitz. Id.
379
Id.
380
Id. at 589. See id. at 591 for more of the questions.
381
Id. at 589–90.
382
Id.
383
Id. at 590. If the account is set up in the employee’s name, that would weigh toward
the employee. Id.
384
Id.
385
Id. at 592. See id. at 593 for questions that will be delved into further in Part III.
386
Id. at 592 (describing how “courts will look at the level of authority the employer
maintains over the accounts in question”).
387
Id.
388
Id. at 592–93.
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Under the fourth factor, “employee persona,”389 courts would
consider “the employee’s online . . . presence.”390 For instance,
courts could look to the employee’s online “individual expressions
of personality, wit, expertise, or flair” as a non-job-related reason
that the employee gained a following.391 The greater the presence of
identity is on social media, the stronger the presumption is that the
employee should retain the account.392 This factor evokes publicity
rights, because this presumption points to a value associated with
the employee’s online persona that should “prevent the employer
from trading on or misappropriating the employee’s identity.”393
For the final factor, “degree of injury”, Park and Abril argued
“that the measure of damages for a publicity rights violation is
the ‘fair market value of the property right in plaintiff’s identity
which defendant has used without permission.’”394 The fair market
value is often determined by evaluating amounts received by
similarly situated persons for comparable uses.395 To broaden the
context of this analysis, Park and Abril suggested using a similar
calculus for noncelebrities.396
For the first factor, nature and purpose of employment relationship, it is likely, as discussed, that BH Media would rely on their
understanding of an implied relationship that was started with
Tucker and continued with Bitter.397 Meanwhile, Bitter would likely
distinguish his use of social media as a journalist from someone
in a role such as social media manager. The additional questions
that Park and Abril raised further indicate that this factor tips toward
Bitter. For instance, they recommended courts ask whether
“building or maintaining a social media presence on behalf of the
employer [is] a critical part of the employee’s job description . . .
[or] did the employee promote the company on social media as a
389

Id. at 593. See id. at 594 for questions that will be delved into further in Part III.
Id. at 593.
391
Id. at 593–94.
392
Id. at 594.
393
Id.
394
Id. at 595 (quoting Jordan v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, 115 F. Supp. 3d 950, 957 (N.D.
Ill. 2015)).
395
Id.
396
Id.
397
See Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 1–2; see also text accompanying note 373.
390
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secondary consideration or out of loyalty to the employer?”398 Bitter
could frame his social media use in a similar fashion as suggested in
the Adam Schefter hypothetical from Moore’s piece.399 On the other
side, BH Media would likely rely on their belief that the Account’s
primary purpose was to drive interest to the employer’s website.400
Park and Abril posited that courts would ask whether “the employee
[was] hired with the understanding that she [or he] would contribute
or import her [or his] existing social media presence to the company?”401 As discussed previously, the parties clearly have
differing viewpoints on the understandings that undergirded their
employment relationship.402 Ultimately, therefore, it is likely
that courts would weigh this factor toward Bitter due to the
factual ambiguities.403
The second factor, the purpose and nature of the social media
account, also has arguments for both sides. BH Media could note
the Account’s handle under Tucker’s management was
@KyleTuckerVP.404 The company could then note the discussion
after Bitter started using the Account regarding the rationale for not
including a reference to BH Media in the handle.405 BH Media could
also distinguish this dispute from one where an employee was hired
because of their already established social media audience.406 Then,
BH Media could raise the argument that Bitter had not used the
Account prior to his hiring, and that he allegedly cited his social
398

Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 589.
See Moore, supra note 70, at 516.
400
See Complaint, supra note 139, at 5.
401
Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 589.
402
See supra text accompanying notes 353–56 (explaining in trade secret portion about
how the understandings were not the same, and the burden would likely be on the
employer).
403
See supra text accompanying notes 374–76. A court could weigh this factor toward
Bitter because the account was not created by Bitter at all, and the fact that the Account
benefited the employer only appears secondary in the purpose of the account. See supra
text accompanying notes 374–76.
404
See Plaintiff Reply Memo, supra note 158, at 3–4; see also supra text accompanying
note 190.
405
See Plaintiff Reply Memo, supra note 158, at 6.
406
See Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 589 (“[I]f an employee’s existing account(s) and
social media audience were important factors in her hiring . . . , then the presumption would
be that the employee is entitled to keep the administrative rights to the profile and its
associated audience when employment ends.”).
399
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media skills in an interview.407 In noting that the Account pre-dated
Bitter’s employment, BH Media could note Park and Abril’s assertion that “[i]f the employee’s job required maintenance of an
account that had been set up before employment began, that would
weigh in favor of the employer’s continued right to the audience
associated with it.”408
Conversely, Bitter could note that the Account was created
under Tucker’s personal email address, and private account-related
details were passed via personal email addresses.409 As noted in the
analysis for the previous framework, Bitter did not change the
Account’s handle to include a reference to the employer publication.410 In addition, Bitter could point to the Account being transferred without involvement from BH Media.411 Park and Abril also
suggested analyzing whether the social media account was
“predominantly” used for professional or personal purposes.412
Bitter could refer to the fact that some of his most popular posts on
the Account were about his personal life.413 Conversely, BH Media
would probably note that Bitter almost exclusively used the Account
to share information about Virginia Tech football.414 Based on the
predominance of tweets about Virginia Tech football and the other
arguments laid out above, courts would likely find that this factor
narrowly tips toward BH Media.
The third factor, employer access and control, would clearly
favor Bitter because once he received the Account’s information
from Tucker, he never shared the password with his employer, and
never allowed another BH Media employee to post on the

407

See Plaintiff Reply Memo, supra note 158, at 6.
Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 589.
409
See Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 2 (citing Tucker Testimony, supra note 178);
see also text accompanying notes 256–59.
410
See supra Part II.A.4.
411
Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 1–2.
412
Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 591.
413
See Counterclaim, supra note 141, at 14.
414
See Plaintiff Reply Memo, supra note 158, at 9 (“This is shown by Mr. Bitter’s prolific
(daily) tweeting about Virginia Tech athletics (which was his job) and his usages of the
Account for almost no other reason.”).
408
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Account.415 Bitter could also claim that BH Media had not tried to
control what Bitter posted on the Account by noting that BH Media
encouraged (rather than demanded) reporters to use their personal
social media accounts to promote their work.416 As to employer control, Park and Abril argued that “[e]mployees should have a strong
claim to social media they created and infused with their own identity . . . for the purposes of socialization or personal networking.”417
While BH Media could point to Bitter predominantly tweeting about
Virginia Tech football as support their argument,418 Bitter could
counter that the Account’s audience grew through his own efforts.419
Even if the vast majority of Bitter’s tweets on the Account were
work-related, Park and Abril’s proposed analysis tips in favor of
Bitter,420 as Bitter was not “writing anonymously or pseudonymously on behalf of the employer . . . .”421 Further, Bitter wrote or
created the majority of the content featured on the Account.,422
which he could cite as support for the argument that his work on the
Account granted him notoriety independent of BH Media.
The final Park and Abril factor, “degree of injury,”423 is
inconclusive as to whether it favors BH Media or Bitter, given

415

See Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 2; see also supra text accompanying note

393.
416

See Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 8–10.
Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 593. This factor considers “the employee’s online
persona and presence,” by looking at the employee’s “individual expressions of
personality, wit, expertise, or flair . . . .” Id. at 593–94. Expressions of individuality can be
deemed non-work-related reasons that an employee as built a social media audience. Id.
418
See Plaintiff Reply Memo, supra note 158, at 9 (“This is shown by Mr. Bitter’s prolific
(daily) tweeting about Virginia Tech athletics (which was his job) and his usages of the
Account for almost no other reason.”).
419
See Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 1–2 (“Through his own efforts over the past
7 years, Bitter now has nearly 28,000 followers.”) (internal citation omitted).
420
See Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 594 (listing the proposed questions).
421
See id.
422
See id. (“Did the employee write or create the majority of his or her own content?”);
see also Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 1–2 (“Since Tucker gave him the Account,
Bitter alone has (1) maintained ownership and control of his Account; (2) accessed and
posted to his Account; (3) possessed login information for his Account; and (4) created all
the content on his Account, including content relating to Virginia Tech football and
personal insights and opinions about unrelated matters, all subject to his sole and absolute
discretion.”).
423
See Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 594–96.
417
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courts’ reticence to address the issue.424 Bitter could possibly claim
an injury based on the time and effort spent to build the Account’s
following.425 On the other hand, BH Media alleges that “The
Account would cost at least $150,000 to recreate . . . .”426 Park and
Abril readily acknowledged that courts have not allowed damages
for employees, even if “they successfully make a prima facie showing of a violation to their publicity rights.”427 Due to courts’
eagerness to settle matters, the Western District of Virginia’s
decision to send BH Media v. Bitter to a magistrate judge for
settlement means that there is still no precedent set for calculating
injury and damages in these types of cases.428 With one factor
inconclusive, three factors tipping toward Bitter, and one factor
weighing in favor of BH Media, a court utilizing this framework
would likely find that Bitter should maintain control of the Account.
Part III will advocate for adopting the publicity-rights framework
proposed by Professors Park and Abril.
III. ENDORSING A PUBLICITY RIGHTS APPROACH
A. Why A Publicity Framework Is Preferable to the Other
Frameworks Discussed
First, this Part demonstrates why the right of publicity framework most efficiently captures compelling elements from the other
frameworks discussed, and how it could be seen as a path of least
resistance for courts. Then, this Part explains that a publicity-rightsbased framework will be particularly useful in employment contexts
for journalists and others in public-facing positions who rely on
social media and post content onto an employer’s forum.

424

See supra Part I.C. (providing discussion of the cases).
Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 24–25.
426
Complaint, supra note 139, at 15.
427
Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 595.
428
See Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11–4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 12, 2013).
425
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1. Theories Involving In re CTLI
While both Jamel and Moore’s suggested frameworks were
sufficiently applicable to the conflict between BH Media and Andy
Bitter, there are several reasons why a publicity-rights-based framework would be more suitable. Both Jamel and Moore advocated for
looking to the pertinent social media platform’s terms of service.429
However, because people generally avoid looking at terms of
service before signing an employment agreement,430 it would seem
more just and fair if courts do not rely on this fine print when
determining who controls a social media account.
As to the property argument, given non-bankruptcy courts’
hesitance to declare a property interest in a social media account,431
it would be sensible for courts to avoid using such a framework.
Similarly, it would be more efficient for courts to use a framework
in which they do not have to assign a tangible value to a social
media account.
At the same time, however, aspects of both Jamel and Moore’s
suggested frameworks overlap with Park and Abril’s publicity rights
approach. For instance, Jamel’s first factor, the employee’s use of
the account,432 is covered by Park and Abril’s first and second
factors.433 As to Moore, the tests he proposed to determine the
presumptive licensee434 can be found in Park and Abril’s first,
second, and fourth factors.435 Further, in determining an account’s
content and use from Moore’s framework, the first four factors of
Park and Abril’s framework would be addressed.436
429

See supra Part II.A.
See, e.g., Caroline Cakebread, You’re Not Alone, No One Reads Terms of Service
Agreements, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com
/deloitte-study-91-percent-agree-terms-of-service-without-reading-2017-11
[https://perma.cc/79MY-Y5M4].
431
See supra Part I.C.
432
See Jamel, supra note 160, at 595 (“How does how the individual account holder use
the account?”).
433
See Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 588 (“(1) the purpose and nature of the
employment relationship; (2) the purpose and nature of the social media account, including
its creation”).
434
See Moore, supra note 70, at 515–16 (citing In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359, 372
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015)); see supra Part II.A.
435
See supra Part II.A.
436
See id.
430
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2. CFAA
As with the bankruptcy analyses, courts applying the CFAA
framework would run into the concern of concretely determining a
monetary loss from losing access to a social media account.437 In
addition, the CFAA framework, as described by Miao, may be too
rigid and inapplicable for journalists. As demonstrated in the previous section, when there are questions of fact regarding the CFAA
elements,438 courts may have trouble applying that framework.
Finally, utilizing Park and Abril’s scheme avoids the extra work of
differentiating between different jurisdictional standards of proof
when deciding if an element of a claim has been satisfied.439
However, some overlap exists between Miao’s framework and Park
and Abril’s, as Miao’s suggestions of how a court might find
value440 could be utilized by courts in determining Park and Abril’s
fifth factor.441
3. Hired-to-Invent and Shop Right Theories
Mitchell’s proposed framework could adequately cover disputes
such as that between BH Media and Bitter. However, the determination of a hired-to-invent versus a shop right could lead to
unnecessary hurdles in litigation because the differences between
the two doctrines determine who should get ultimate control of a
social media account.442 Instead, courts can avoid this potentially
superfluous dispute through Park and Abril’s framework, which
adequately investigates the key aspects of the hired-to-invent443 and
437

See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part II.B.
439
See supra text accompanying notes 301–03 (showing subtle differences between the
Citrin and Brekka-Nosal standards).
440
See Miao, supra note 138, at 1059–60; see also supra text accompanying note 309.
441
Miao, supra note 138 (internal citations omitted).
442
See supra text accompanying notes 333–43 (proposing how a dispute between Bitter
and BH Media might look if courts embraced a model using the hired-to-invent and shopright doctrines).
443
In the hired-to-invent analysis, Mitchell proposes that courts might ask whether “a
company hires someone specifically to manage its social media accounts,” which would
point toward a contractual quid pro quo based on the “maintenance of a creative social
media presence in exchange for compensation.” See supra text accompanying notes 315–
16 (quoting Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1489). These questions are covered by Park and
Abril’s first (“the purpose and nature of the employment relationship”), second (“the
438
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shop-right444 doctrines. At the same time, however, it could make
sense for employers to borrow from the shop-right doctrine and
contract for the ability to reach out to the relevant account’s
followers following the employee’s departure.445
4. Trade Secret
As with the other approaches, Professor Argento’s trade secret
analysis would be covered by Park and Abril’s publicity right
factors.446 To that end, the specific factors outlined in Park and
purpose and nature of the social media account, including its creation”), and possibly fourth
(“the degree to which the employee’s persona is infused in the forum”) factors. See supra
text accompanying notes 399–406 (citing Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 588–92)
(describing the first and second factors); see also supra text accompanying notes 411–15
(citing Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 593–94) (summarizing the fourth factor).
444
In the shop-right analysis, Mitchell’s discussion highlights “scenarios in which
employees have pre-existing personal social media accounts to which they actively and
regularly post work-related information,” and whether the employee uses (or created) the
relevant social media account “on the clock.” See supra text accompanying notes 325, 328
(citing Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1490, 1491) (describing the shop-right doctrine).
Pursuant to the shop-right doctrine, Mitchell considers “consent to the employer’s use,” at
least in part by considering whether the social media account refers to the employer, and
whether the employer allows the employer to access the account. See supra text
accompanying notes 329–31 (citing Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1492). The shop-right
analysis highlights Park and Abril’s third factor (“the employer’s access or control of the
social media account”), in addition to the factors that are touched by the hired-to-invent
elements. See supra text accompanying notes 407–10 (citing Park & Abril, supra note 99,
at 592–93) (summarizing the third factor).
445
Whether or not Bitter was asked or forced to do so, Bitter seemed to have done this.
See Andy Bitter (@AndyBitterVT), TWITTER (Nov. 15, 2018, 4:34 PM), https://twitter.com
/AndyBitterVT/status/1063183578215931910 [https://perma.cc/6JSK-MKGX] (“If you’re
inclined, consider following my successor at the Roanoke Times, Mike Niziolek, at
@VTSportsRT.”).
446
Argento notes how “the party that does the work of creating the account should, by
default, have the rights to the account.” Argento, supra note 122, at 263; see also supra
text accompanying note 364. This could be covered with Park & Abril’s second factor (“the
purpose and nature of the social media account, including its creation”). See Park & Abril,
supra note 99, at 589–92 (describing the second factor); see also text accompanying notes
401–06 (summarizing the same). Argento also describes how “the fact that a worker agreed
to use her social network account to benefit the employer . . . does not necessarily imply
that the parties agreed that the account itself belongs to the employer.” See supra text
accompanying note 351 (quoting Argento, supra note 122, at 266). She also argues that
“the employer should bear a heavy burden in demonstrating that the parties had agreed that
the employer would control a social media account.” See supra text accompanying note
376 (quoting Argento, supra note 122, at 266). This would be covered by, at least, the first,
second, and fourth factors. See supra text accompanying notes 397–406 (citing Park &
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Abril’s article allow for courts to uniformly apply a process, while
Professor Argento’s piece does not necessarily present a consistent
approach.447 In addition, looking at Park and Abril’s approach
would allow courts to avoid affirmatively designating that a
password is a trade secret.448
5. Right of Publicity
There are several advantages to Park and Abril’s approach, as
touched on in the discussions of the other frameworks. The publicity
right’s straightforward criteria, with many possible questions for
each factor, is adaptable to various employment situations and social
media platforms. Perhaps most notably, this approach would not
Abril, supra note 99, at 588–92) (describing the first and second factors); see also supra
text accompanying notes 411–15 (citing Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 593–94)
(summarizing the fourth factor). Then, Argento’s discussion of customs could implicate
those same factors, as well as the third factor (“the employer’s access or control of the
social media account.”). See supra text accompanying notes 408–10 (citing Park & Abril,
supra note 99, at 592–93) (summarizing the third factor). Questions regarding the “nature
of the content” on the relevant social media account would implicate the second and fourth
factors. See supra text accompanying note 368 (quoting Argento, supra note 122, at 267)
(describing the “nature of the content” element); see also Park & Abril, supra note 99, at
589–92 (describing the second factor); see also text accompanying notes 403–07
(summarizing the same); see also supra text accompanying notes 412–16 (citing Park &
Abril, supra note 99, at 593–94) (summarizing the fourth factor). Then, the “dedication of
resources” consideration can be covered by the first, second, and fourth Park & Abril
factors. See supra text accompanying notes 400–07 (citing Park & Abril, supra note 99, at
588–92) (describing the first and second factors); see also supra text accompanying notes
412–16 (citing Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 593–94) (summarizing the fourth factor).
Finally, Argento suggests that courts look to “the name of the account, exclusivity of
access, the type of account, and whether the account preexists the employment
relationship.” See supra text accompanying note 386 (quoting Argento, supra note 122, at
268). These considerations are covered, at a minimum, by Park & Abril’s second and third
(“the employer’s access or control of the social media account,”) factors respectively. See
Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 589–92 (describing the second factor); see also text
accompanying notes 401–06 (summarizing the same); see also supra text accompanying
notes 408–10 (citing Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 592–93) (summarizing the third
factor).
447
See, e.g., Argento, supra note 122, at 268 (“Finally, the fact that an account preexists
the employment relationship obviates the need to analyze ownership under the work-madefor-hire doctrine.”).
448
See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1489–90 (“The court would not have to grapple
with whether a public list could be considered ‘secret’ by virtue of containing seventeen
thousand names. Nor would it have to determine whether the value of the contacts derived
independent value based on that secrecy, let alone what that value was.”).
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require courts to make the intellectual-property or computer-crime
related affirmations that have frustrated courts in previous cases and
in the some of the works that this Note cites.
B. A Publicity Rights Framework Is Preferable for the Media
Industry
Utilizing a right of publicity framework translates well to those
in public-facing careers who might use social media, particularly the
fourth factor in Park and Abril’s framework, which investigates the
“Employee Persona.”449 This factor allows courts to recognize the
long-standing importance of a social media account in building
one’s own brand and following.450
A publicity framework could create a scenario where accounts
with an individual’s name, even if made at the direction of their
employer, would ultimately belong to the employee. This result
accords with the industry custom that has seemingly developed
thanks to figures such as Bill Simmons, Michelle Beadle, Marc
Stein, and J.A. Adande.451 However, such a policy would run
counter to long-standing recommendations for how journalists use
social media452 and to BH Media’s own stated policy for how
journalists use personally named social media accounts.453
A publicity right framework also accounts for the fact that
handles can easily be changed, which suggests that it is not hard to
disassociate the individual from the former employer even when that
individual continues to use the same social media account. When a
potentially disputed account changes its handle, this signals to the

449

See Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 593; see also supra Part II.A.
See Betancourt, supra note 21 (indicating that Twitter accounts allow journalists to
“engage with their audience, connect with sources and continue building their personal
brands”).
451
See, e.g., Adande Testimony, supra note 181, at 4–6 (describing the experiences of
himself and other figures wherein they changed jobs and maintained control of the Twitter
accounts they had been using).
452
See Betancourt, supra note 21 (advising journalists how to use Twitter in 2009); see
also Peters, supra note 30 (“By sharing the work of others, you’re letting your readers
discover new sources of information that they can trust, because they already trust you (a
huge thing in the age of fake news), and you’re helping your colleagues find a new audience
with whom to engage.”).
453
See Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 8.
450
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consumer that the previous author has left their position. Such an
implied change can be cemented by a note to follow a successor.
Therefore, a publicity rights framework properly eradicates
consumer confusion about an individual’s professional affiliation
when the individual switches jobs but maintains control of the
relevant social media account.
By considering the individual’s persona, a right of publicity
framework also accounts for scenarios in which the employer’s
resources might be used in promoting the account. For instance, in
the aforementioned Adam Schefter hypothetical, a journalist could
be using social media to link to their employer’s website to benefit
the individual.454 However, such linking also drives traffic toward
the employer’s website or platform, thus creating a mutually
beneficial arrangement for both employee and employer.
If a court found for BH Media, it could lead to negative
outcomes for media outlets and hurt journalists individually.
Journalists might resist using their personal accounts to share their
work for an employer, in case their employer may try to claim
ownership of their account at a later time.455 The individual could
also resort to using a branded account, with no personality and
flair,456 potentially damaging the reporter’s credibility.457
A policy echoing BH Media’s claims in the case could stifle
other media outlets’ recruitment of employees who already have
large social media audiences because such individuals might be
discouraged from working with that employer. Such a policy could
also adversely affect an employer’s marketability to consumers, as
consumers might be introduced to a company because of an
individual’s “particular expertise and musings.”458

454

See Moore, supra note 70, at 516.
See Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 25–26 (“The public likewise has an interest
in protecting employees’ personal social media accounts from claims of corporate
ownership, particularly when, as here, the employer failed to provide employees with
notice their personal accounts may be subject to a later claim of corporate ownership if
used in connection with their employment.”).
456
See Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 593–94.
457
See Stroud, supra note 46.
458
See Park & Abril, supra note 99, at 586.
455
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A continuance of the implied policy that employees can keep
personally named accounts, even if those accounts are created
at the employer’s direction, ultimately helps both parties and suits
the modern workforce—studies show that millennials tend to
switch jobs more often, and the “gig economy” is
increasingly prominent.459
With a more elastic workforce, it stands to reason that employers
would prefer someone with an already established audience.
Employees with large followings would not want to use that
audience to promote work for their employer if they cannot keep
growing that audience or keep the audience once they change job.460
Ultimately, all these issues can simply be avoided with clearer
employee contract language.461
For the foregoing reasons, employer policies that allow individual employees to maintain their social media accounts after concluding their tenure with that employer are advisable, even if such social
media accounts were used to promote their work product. In this
way, all stakeholders benefit, as individual employees are incentivized to build their own brand and such employer policies keep in
line with modern relevant industry and general workforce trends.

459

See, e.g., Jean Chatzky, Job-Hopping Is on the Rise. Should You Consider Switching
Roles to Make More Money?, NBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2018, 2:15 PM), https://www.nbcnews.
com/better/business/job-hopping-rise-should-you-consider-switching-roles-make-morencna868641 [https://perma.cc/Y9HJ-AM3W]; Nancy Dahlberg, The Gig Economy Is Big
and Here to Stay: How Workers Survive and Thrive, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Sept. 6, 2017,
9:15 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-gig-economy-workers-20170906story.html [https://perma.cc/WVG3-JWTR]. The journalism industry itself has also been
very volatile recently, and has seen considerable layoffs in early 2019. See Alexander
Kaufman (@AlexCKaufman), TWITTER (Feb. 1, 2019, 1:59 PM), https://twitter.com
/AlexCKaufman/status/1091410831919796225
[https://perma.cc/NK8C-2GNW]
(highlighting that there were over one thousand layoffs across the journalism industry in
January 2019 alone).
460
See Opposition Memo, supra note 177, at 25–26 (“The public likewise has an interest
in protecting employees’ personal social media accounts from claims of corporate
ownership, particularly when, as here, the employer failed to provide employees with
notice their personal accounts may be subject to a later claim of corporate ownership if
used in connection with their employment.”).
461
See Kramer, supra note 11 (“A well-drafted agreement can often be the silver bullet
in these types of cases . . . .”).
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CONCLUSION
When a dispute arises between a media outlet and a journalist
over the journalist’s Twitter account, a right of publicity approach,
as proposed by Park and Abril, provides the most appropriate
framework to determine who retains ultimate control of a social
media account. The right of publicity approach is preferable because
it avoids reading into a platform’s often ignored terms of service,
and avoids putting courts in a difficult position of making expensive
and time-consuming declarations involving arbitrary judgments
based on various intellectual property doctrines that are not
directly applicable.
Under the recommended publicity rights approach, the efforts
and resources of both employer and former employee are appropriately recognized while also reflecting the current realities of
employment relationships. Further, this approach is best-suited to
respond to the modern journalism and media industries, and
properly recognizes that a social media following might be a reason
to hire someone, and not solely the result of the employment.
Finally, this approach recognizes that contemporary consumers and
social media followers often are more interested in the individual’s
work due to the individual, and not due to their employer.

